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Abstract
I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition
are interdependent. On the one hand the effort to attract consumer attention depends on
the value of attention to the firm which depends on the grade of price competition among all
perceived firms. On the other hand attracting attention involves costs which must be covered
by the earnings from competition. It is the task of this paper to clarify the consequences of
such an interdependence between attention competition and economic competition for prices,
attention effort and market structure as determined by the strategic equilibrium. Under lim-
ited attention the market as perceived by consumers and not the effective market is relevant
to the firms which implies that prices also reflect the scarcity of attention. Less attentive
consumers lead to higher prices but at the same time getting attention is more valuable
which intensifies the competition for attention and leads to higher attention costs. I show
that if attention competition is relatively inelastic or the commodities are strong substitutes
then the gains from consumer inattention outweigh the costs of attracting attention which
leads to higher profits and larger effective markets.
Keywords: Limited Attention, Competition, Pricing, Strategic equilibrium
JEL Classification: D43, D83, L13, C72
∗My special thanks go to Armin Schmutzler and Josef Falkinger. I also wish to thank Larry Samuelson, Rani
Spiegler and Nick Netzer for valuable comments on this and related research projects.
†University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Bluemlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006 Zurich.
E-mail: andreas.hefti@econ.uzh.ch
1
1 Introduction and related literature
The main task of this paper is to provide a static game-theoretic framework that can account for
the well-documented fact that decision-makers (consumers) acquire their resources (commodi-
ties) under limited attention.
Limited attention means the existence of an upper bound on how many different items are
perceived by an individual. If an individual is confronted with more alternatives, an attention
allocation problem exists: which alternatives are perceived (i.e. considered in the economic
decision of the individual) and which not?
The model is solved in the special but empirically important case where the information sender
(the firm) can directly affect the attention allocation of an attention-constrained consumer by
increasing its effort to attract attention relative to the other senders. The possibility to increase
their chance of perception leads the firms to engage in a competition for the scarce consumer
attention - besides competing for the consumer budget in a conventional economic sense. Al-
though the marketing science reports clear evidence for the existence of both limited attention
and competition for attention (see section 1.2), questions regarding the implications of the inter-
dependence between attention competition and conventional economic competition for market
prices and market structure have not been posed previously. In this paper I provide first answers
to such questions in a rather general setting. The framework may be adapted to more specific
models (such as the Salop model of circular product differentiation) which then even allow a
normative investigation of attention competition.
The paper is organised as follows. In the rest of section 1 I revise the relevant literature in
psychology and the marketing science on attention which motivate the main two psychological
building blocks of my model, namely the existence of limited attention and stimulus-driven
attention allocation. Further, I discuss the related literature in economics and finance that has
previously dealt with limited attention. In section 2 I give an informal and intuitive description
of the attention problem and the main model of this paper (introduced in section 3) basically
formalizes the ideas presented there. In section 4 I show that in case of symmtric firms a
symmetric price-attention equilibrium exists both for a given number of firms or when the
number of active firms is determined by free-entry. The (comparative-static) implications of
attention competition are discussed in detail in section 5. In the appendix to this paper I take
the formal analysis one step further by addressing questions concerning uniqueness and stability
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of the (symmetric) equilibrium.
1.1 Psychological literature on attention
In psychological work on attention there is a clear distinction between ”whether attention is
goal-driven, controlled in a top-down fashion, or stimulus driven, controlled in a bottom-up
fashion” (e.g. Yantis (1998), p. 223).
The modern literature on experimental psychology provides evidence for both the active and the
passive role of attention in the context of visual stimulus processing1: ”goal-driven” and ”stim-
ulus driven” attention are important in explaining how subjects perform during visual search
experiments. Nevertheless ”stimulus-driven attentional control is both faster and more potent
than goal-driven attentional control” (Yantis (1998), p. 251-252) - especially in experiments
where attention cannot be focused on a certain region in advance. This literature argues that
attention operates as a gating mechanism if multiple stimuli use the same neural pathway by
”restricting the amount of information that is processed at once” (Mozer and Sitton (1998), p.
342) because parallel processing of information is not possible due to mental capacity limitations.
Then the relative strength of a stimulus that enters the neural network of a person determines
whether or not it is further transmitted into the neural network and eventually reaches the
recognition network (Mozer and Sitton (1998), p. 343-356). That capacity limitations impose
a ”bottleneck” to visual stimulus processing is convincingly illustrated in experiments on visual
search: response time of subjects to a stimulus is flat if few objects are displayed but increases
exponentially with the number of displayed objects (Mozer and Sitton (1998), p. 378-340).
Hence perception gets distracted under many signals which ultimately slows down response
time. In explaining search time in visual search the ”relative salience of a target” is much more
important than ”the occurrence of specific features” (Nothdurft (2000), p. 1184). Hence in order
to generate a ”pop-up” or ”salience effect” the motion, color or luminance of an object matters
only relatively to the local and global surrounding of the object. Experiments conducted to
assess the spatial distribution of attention on the visual field suggest that attention works as a
”spotlight”: once a location is selected, all features at that location are processed and moved
on to the recognition network (e.g. Kahneman and Henik (1981)) or at least ”receive enhanced
1In such experiments subjects are usually required to identify the orientation of some geometric object that e.g.
briefly flashes up where there might also be distractive stimuli present and response time of subjects is measured.
See Yantis (Yantis (1998)) for an overview of such experiments.
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processing” (Maunsell and Treue (2006)).
We may summarise the key messages of the psychological research in case of visual attention as
follows:
P1) In the case of multiple stimuli relative signal strength matters whether a signal is processed
or not.
P2) For a given spatial array of objects, if a region successfully attracts attention then all
features of this region are considered.
Note that P1) also means that in case of multiple overlapping stimuli certain signals are inhib-
ited2 and not processed to the recognition network.
1.2 Limited attention in the marketing science
In the marketing literature it is a well-documented fact that the placement of a link on the screen
of some online search site is a crucial determinant of the number of clicks that a site receives.
For example using a dataset of a price listing service Baye et al. find that ”a firm receives
about 17% fewer clicks for every competitor listed above it on the screen” (Baye et al. (2009),
p. 938) but that the relationship between clicks and screen location is far from being linear.
That ranking matters for clicks on search pages is also confirmed by Smith and Brynjolfsson
(Smith and Brynjolfsson (2004)) in the context of online book markets and by Ghose and Yang
in the context of sponsored search advertising (Ghose and Yang (2009)). Having sales data in
case of memory modules Ellison and Ellison (Ellison and Ellison (2009), p. 442) report that on
a price search engine ”moving from first to seventh on the list reduces a websites sales [...] by
83%”. Dreze and Zufryden, using data on the web traffic of Amazon and Ebay, point out that
a site can increase its visibility to potential consumers most by altering its linkage in the web
and thereby improving its indexing by search engines (Dreze and Zufryden (2004), p. 35). Most
noteworthy is the finding that the first three positions get about 75% out of all clicks of the first
ten positions on the screen (Baye et al. (2009), p. 945) and positions with rank larger than three
do not differ substantially from each other. This finding is also confirmed by Ghose and Yang
who additionally document a non-monotonic relationship between rank and profitability (Ghose
2See Milliken and Tipper (1998), p. 204-206 for experiments on the importance of inhibition in selection
experiments.
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and Yang (2009), p. 1614). This is explained by the fact that both costs and clicks decrease
with a higher rank (a lower on-screen position) but that clicks decrease slower than costs. Hence
it may be of less importance to be the first on the list but what matters is to be among the
first few entries. A related finding of Smith and Brynjolfsson is that in case of the market for
books being on the first page of a search page is of central relevance for receiving a high number
of clicks and might even be more important than being the overall first in the list (Smith and
Brynjolfsson (2004), p. 548-549). First-page dominance is also found by Jansen et al. (Jansen
et al. (2000), p. 215). Finally, Pan et al. show in an eyeball-tracking experiment that the first
entries on a Google search page get by far most viewing-time but there is no statistical difference
between the first and the second item on the list (Pan et al. (2007), p. 814). In their online
experiment Pan et al. further show that people frequently select the upper items of a list in a
quality based search experiment even if these upper items systematically are of inferior quality.
Hence the Pan finding suggests that people consider the first few alternatives in making their
decisions independent of the overall quality of these alternatives.
The theoretical literature in marketing has recognised the empirical fact that consumers make
their decision conditional on a subset of all possible alternatives. In such models consumers
are believed to phase their decision in two parts using simple heuristics to screen all possible
alternatives and then make a more thorough analysis of the reduced consideration set (Manrai
and Andrews (1998); see Payne et al. (1993), Chapter 2, for an overview of different decision
strategies). Hauser and Wernerfeld (Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990)) provide an overview of
marketing studies that find empirical evidence for the existence of such consideration sets and
emphasise that these sets usually are very small (a size of 3 − 6 alternatives) compared to the
complete set of possible alternatives3. Moreover, the consideration sets of supermarket shoppers
seem to depend heavily on what is promoted strongly (Fader and McAlister (1990), p. 330-
331). This is also supported by Mitra who reports that advertising does not alter the average
size of the consideration set but it does influence which alternatives are in the consideration
set in an experimental setting (Mitra (1995), p. 91). Mehta et al. use a structural model of
quality-adjusted price search to estimate in-shop brand selection in case of liquid detergents
and find that consumers frequently purchase low quality products ”simply because they fail to
notice the prices of the other brands” (Mehta et al. (2003), p. 76) and, at the same time, it
3In case of shampoos the mean consideration set contained only four shampoos out of more than 30 (Hauser
and Wernerfelt (1990)).
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is ”the most feature-advertised and displayed brand”. Similarly, Alba and Chattopadhyay find
experimental evidence that higher salience of a brand inhibits the recall of other brands (Alba
and Chattopadhyay (1986), p. 365).
The key messages of marketing and internet research are:
M1) The on-screen ranking of links determines the clicking distribution and is sale relevant.
M2) There appears to be a discontinuity and non-linearity between the clicks of the first few
entries and the later entries of search pages and there is first-page relevance.
M3) Consideration sets of consumers exist and are small. The size of the set is not affected
e.g. by advertising. Firms can influence their chance of consideration e.g. by means of
promotion.
Note that P1) and P2) can explain M1) in the sense that people cannot process all information
on a search screen in parallel and thus perceive the links from top to bottom. That flashy links
by means of position or different color attract attention and hence clicks (the finding of Ghose
and Yang (2009)) coincides with Nothdurft’s (2000) observation that the relative salience of
objects determines the speed of their detection and also is reflected by the fact that sponsored
search advertising (purchasing advertising space and a different link color in the Google top-
and sideframe) has become ”the largest source of revenues for search engines” (Ghose and Yang
(2009), p. 1605). Further P2) and M2) seem related as the empirical evidence suggests the
clicking behavior to cluster around the first search page and the first entries of a page. Finally,
M2) and M3) are related as the discontinuity could be explained by the fact that people consider
only a small subset of all information and their selection rule follows a simple top-down logic.
The facts documented in the last two sections suggest that:
1. Decision-makers have limited attention: They focus only on a subset of all available infor-
mation.
2. Relative salience of the information (e.g. its on-screen ranking) crucially determines which
information receives attention.
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1.3 Limited attention in economics and finance
In a seminal paper Herbert Simon revises the notion of the “rational economic man” by intro-
ducing ”internal constraints” which account for the fact that besides the conventional budget
constraint that represents economic scarcity an agent also faces physiological and psycholog-
ical limitations to which he must obey (Simon (1955)). Consecutively, much theoretical and
empirical effort was undertaken to comprehend what such bounds might imply for economic
models. In many cases bounds on the information processing capabilities of agents have been
found of central importance. The claim of these models usually is that acquiring and processing
information imposes some cost on the agent. The existence of such deliberation costs then leads
to a trade-off in decision-making (see Payne et al. (1993)): better decisions are available only at
the expense of purchasing more information.
However, the information problem in a modern economy might be less one of getting information
but one of receiving too much information. Maybe the central phenomen of the digital age is
that ”Information has gone from scarce to superabundant4”.
Together with such limitations the ”wealth of information” then implies a ”scarcity of attention”
(Simon (1971)). Managing scarce attention is seen to be the central task of modern business:
”If you want to be successful in the current economy, you’ve got to be good at getting attention”
(Davenport and Beck (2001), p. 8).
This distinction of attention as an active or passive part of perception as was introduced in
section 1.1 is reflected in the modern economic literature on attention. Taken to economic
theory the dichotomy translates into the question whether the individual itself allocates its
attention, i.e. the allocation problem is a part of the individuals optimization problem, or
the attention allocation depends on the (relative) strength of different stimuli the individual is
exposed to. Other than the strong evidence for the stimulus-driven attention allocation suggests
the vast part of the economic literature on attention is concerned with goal-driven allocation
meachanisms.
4Cited in: The Economist, ”Data, data everywhere. A special report on managing information” Feb 27th
2010, p.3.
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1.3.1 Goal-driven attention allocation
In models of rational inattention (Reis (2006a) and Reis (2006b), also Gifford (2005)) infor-
mation acquisition is costly and a part of the agent’s maximization problem. In the dynamic
context of these models the consumers only sporadically update their information which is
interpreted as an agent being inattentive for some time concerning further information. Sims
investigates the implications of rational inattention on macroeconomic topics such as the perma-
nent income hypothesis using Shannon’s information theory (Sims (2003)). Gabaix and Laibson
develop a cost-benefit model that endogenously explains how subjects allocate their limited
mental resources to different elements of a decision problem and provide experimental evidence
in support of their directed cognition effect (Gabaix et al. (2003) and Gabaix et al. (2006)). In
finance limited attention of market actors has been taken into account by different researchers.
For example, Mondria et al. show that the magnitude of home bias in investments can be ex-
plained substantially by the allocation of investor’s limited attention (Mondria et al. (2010)).
Gifford presents a dynamic principal-agent model of venture capital where the venture capital-
ist (the agent) must decide in each period how much attention (or time) to allocate towards
managing a current venture or towards funding new ventures (Gifford (1997)). Using an NYSE
dataset from 2002 Corwin and Coughenour show that the ability of specialist traders to provide
liquidity to a stock is negatively correlated with the attention required by the other stocks in
the portfolio (Corwin and Coughenour (2008)). Peng shows that investors allocate their limited
attention across sources of uncertainty to minimize total portfolio uncertainty (Peng (2005)),
and Huberman (Huberman (2001)) as well as Barber and Odean (Barber and Odean (2008))
provide evidence that investors tend to focus on familiar stocks and that information may not
be incorporated into prices until it attracts sufficient investor attention. These are all examples
of economic models that deal with a goal-driven type of attention allocation.
1.3.2 Stimulus-driven attention allocation
The smaller part of the economic literature on attention focuses on stimulus-driven attention
allocation. If attention is stimulus-driven this naturally moves the behaviour of the information
sender into the centre of interest. For example, Falkinger (Falkinger (2007), Falkinger (2008))
works with a macroeconomic model where consumer attention is not a decision variable and
attention is allocated only by the strength of the signals the consumers receive. Such a passive
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allocation process exists if and only if there is an abundance of information compared to a
certain information overflow threshold. Such an economy is called information-rich as opposed
to an information-poor economy where the receivers of information are capable of perceiving
all information. Falkinger shows that whether an economy is information-rich or information
poor is determined by fundamentals such as preferences, budget, information technology and
production technology.
Hirshleifer and Teoh illustrate the implications of limited investor attention on stock prices if
the manager of a firm can influence the perception of a financial report by disclosing additional
material (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)). They show that managers have an incentive to include
additional pro forma (non-GAAP) measures on earnings to improve the perception of the firm
as inattentive investors treat pro forma earnings as if they were adjusted by the manager to
be maximally informative. This failure of the inattentive investors to account for the strategic
incentive of the manager implies that i) pro forma earnings are upward biased predictions of
terminal cash flows and ii) stock prices are too high compared to a situation were reporting of
pro forma earnings were forbidden.
Although the model of this paper is principally general enough to accomodate both types of
attention allocation mechanisms I will, inspired by the strong empirical evidence, concentrate
solely on the stimulus-driven mechanism throughout the paper.
2 An informal description of the attention problem
In this section I illustrate the attention problem in a schematic and intuitive way. The main
part of this paper formalises these schematics and derives a game-theoretic model where firms
(information senders) compete for consumer attention and consumer budget.
2.1 A simple consumer choice problem
Suppose for the sake of illustration that there are n = 4 firms. Each firm produces one commodity
and sets a price yj . Consumer i decides how much to purchase from each commodity. ϕi is the
choice function of consumer i. How much of which commodity the consumer purchases (xij)
depends on his preferences and budget v and on the prices of the commodities. This standard
decision problem is illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1: A classical consumer decision problem
2.1.1 Informative advertising and limited information
In models of informative advertising consumers are ex ante uninformed about existing commodi-
ties (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Goeree (2008)). They learn about the commodities only
by the information (ads) they receive from the firms and choose only among the commodities
they are aware of. Such a situation is depicted in figure 2. In the figure we see that only firms
1 2
3
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0 , x12 ,0 , x14
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Figure 2: Limited information
two and four managed to inform consumer i. That is, the consumer received ads only from these
firms but not of firm one and three and he decides only among those firms he is informed of. If
the firms can choose how many consumers to inform (for example if they can decide in how many
different newspaper to put an ad) then the information set Ii is endogenously determined and
depends on the advertising efforts of the firms. In the figure this is suggested by the firm-specific
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variable φj . The literature on informative advertising says that a consumer who considers a set
of alternatives that is smaller than the set of all existing alternatives has limited information
(see e.g. Goeree (2008)).
2.1.2 Scarce attention
In this paper limited attention means that an upper bound, R <∞, on how much information
can be perceived by a consumer exists. Suppose for the sake of illustration that R = 2. If a
consumer receives information of not more than two firms then he considers all alternatives he
is informed about in making his decision. Such a situation is captured by figure 2. Now suppose
consumer i received information from firms one, two and four but not from firm three, as depicted
in figure 3. Limited attention means the the consumer bases his decision on a subset of Ii that
contains R = 2 different alternatives. As figure 3 suggests there are three possibilities to pick two
alternatives out of the set of three alternatives and Piα for α = 1, 2, 3 with Pi1 + Pi2 + Pi3 = 1
denotes the probability with which consumer i observes a certain attention set A˜iα. In this
paper I will argue that the firms which are a part of Ii have means to influence the probability
distribution (Pi1, Pi2, Pi3). Formally, this means that the probability vector (Pi1, Pi2, Pi3) will
depend on the (relative) choice of attention effort of the firms. That is, firms can influence their
chance of perception.
Note however that other mechanisms that determine the vector can be imagined. In the case
of recommender systems the probability to observe a certain subset would depend on how the
alternatives in Ii are rated by the community. Or we could think of a filter mechanism that
excludes or includes certain alternatives with a certain probability. For example, in figure 3 a
1-pass filter would pass only subsets containing alternative 1, i.e. Pi3 = 0. In the case of goal
driven attention allocation we can think of the vector as determined by the individual itself.
This makes sense e.g. if the alternatives in Ii are different assets (rather than commodities)
and the individual can only manage (e.g. compare) these assets pairwise. Then the probability
vector could be interpreted e.g. as the fraction of time an individual decides to spend by
comparing the different pairs of assets in his portfolio. However, in this paper I stick to the case
where the attention probabilities represent the effort of the attention-seeking firms. I think that
this properly captures how people who use the internet, especially search engines, make their
decision: they are presented with a large list of alternatives and consider only a few alternatives
11
1 2
3 4
243
 x11 , x12 ,0 ,0
42
I i
1
Ai1 Ai2 Ai3
1
4
2
4
1
2
1
P i1 P i2 P i3
 x11 ,0 ,0 , x14 0 , x12 ,0 , x14

i  y
1 ,y
2 , v

i  y
2 ,y
4 ,v

i  y
1 ,y
4 , v
Figure 3: Limited attention
- especially those alternatives that have top positions or are highlighted by some other means
(e.g. in the Google sideframe).
Note that by the notion of the literature on informative advertising the consumer in figure 3
also has limited information - but for a very different reason: the cause is not that he received
only little information but rather that he received more information than he considers. My
contribution essentially shows that if limited information is caused by limited attention rather
than scarce information this generates a very different strategic environment and implies very
different results compared to standard models of informative advertising.
As figure 3 suggests in order to earn money from a consumer a firm must achieve three goals:
i) the firm must inform the consumer (e.g. receive an index by a Google search bot), ii) it must
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be perceived by a consumer (e.g. because it has a high index and a top on-screen placement)
and iii) it must provide a satisfying offer in a conventional economic sense compared to all other
firms that the consumer perceives5. One contribution of this paper is to provide a specification
of how the firms in Ii can influence their chance of perception. This means that the probabil-
ity distribution (Pi1, Pi2, Pi3) in figure 3 will be endogenously determined and depends on the
strategic attention efforts of the firms in Ii. What I want the model to capture is that if in figure
3 firm one’s messages are relatively conspicuous compared to the messages of firms two and four
then we should have Pi1 + Pi2 ≈ 1.
To make the difference between figure 2 and figure 3 as clear as possible suppose firms can
advertise only by posting ads in different newspapers. Consumers do not read all newspapers.
If a firm places its ads in more newspapers this increases the number of people that could see
the ad. Put differently, this increases the number of information sets that contain the firm.
Suppose now a consumer reads a newspaper that contains many ads of different firms. Then it
is reasonable to assume that a large or colorful ad or an ad placed on the front page has a larger
chance of getting the readers attention than a small ad somewhere on the last pages. That is,
contrary to the theory of informative advertising, a firm that advertises in many newspapers
but has very non-salient ads may go unnoticed by most consumers. In essence, it is this struggle
for attention which is the main concern of this paper.
3 A formal model of attention and price competition
3.1 The Internet economy
For many people the internet nowadays is the main source of information and, as e.g. the stories
of Google’s or facebook’s success document, the internet also offers great business opportunities.
But the internet, especially a search page such as Google, also provides the most convincing
example of the prevalence of limited attention. A typical Google search query usually results in
an enormous number of hits6. As suggested by the observations documented in the introduction,
the typical user of a search engine focuses on the first few entries (or on the first few pages)
instead of threading through the entire list. Moreover, this information is accessible for any
5Suppose that consumer i perceives the set A˜i1 in figure 3. Then firm one competes with firm two for the
consumer budget v.
6For example, the keyword ”Hawaii” gives approximately 123’000’000 hits and the query ”Hawaii vacations”
gives approximately 8’160’000 hits (January 09, 2011).
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consumer in the world provided he has access to the internet. This clearly illustrates that the
contemporaneous (and future) information problem of an advertising firm is less one of reaching
more consumers (more information sets) but one of making its messages salient. In the Google
example this e.g. means to be listed on the first page of a search query.7 In this paper I
extrapolate this observation by assuming that every active firm that pays a fixed cost F > 0
reaches the entire population ∆. Hence all consumers have the same information set: Ii = I. In
the Google example this means that if a firm designs a web page and puts it online (achieving
this requires some fixed amount of money) it is found and indexed by a Google bot. However,
whether the firm has a high or a low index (a top rank position or not) depends on further
investments8 of the firm. Setting Ii = I appears also to be adequate for mature product classes.
For such products, e.g. Coke and Pepsi, the role of advertising is not information provision
about the features but ”keeping a product top-of-mind” (Iyer et al. (2005), p. 464) for which
”these companies spend a significant amount of their budget on reminder-advertising”. I simply
call an economy where a firm is either in all or in no information set an ”internet economy”. If a
firm pays the setup cost F then I call the firm active. Suppose there are n active firms indexed
by 1, ..., n in the internet economy. Then n = |I|.
3.2 Attention and price competition in the internet economy
In this section I formalise the schematics of figure 3. First, I develop a model that determines
how the attention efforts of the active firms influence their probability of being perceived by
a consumer. Then I combine this model with a model of imperfect price competition. I will
provide a simple example that accompanies and illustrates the abstract theory developed in this
section. In the end of section 3 we will have a completely specified model of n active firms
that simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their attention effort and their price. I will
restrict myself to the case of symmetric firms. Thus formally we will have to deal with a static
two-dimensional symmetric n-player game.
7As a Web commentator puts it: ”Simply, you want to be found at the common meeting point...page 1 of a
Google search” (see www.optimum7.com).
8For example, the firm can try to get more cross-links to its webpage or can bid for a placement in the Google
sideframe. In both cases there is some kind of variable cost involved.
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3.2.1 Attention probabilities
Suppose there are n active firms in the internet economy and hence n = |I|. The power set
of I is denoted by P ≡ P(I) and I call an element A ∈ P an attention set. Limited attention
means that only attention sets not larger than some 1 < R <∞ are considered by a consumer.
I denote the attention set of consumer i (the set of alternatives that the consumer effectively
perceives) by A˜i ⊂ I. Limited attention means that
∣∣∣A˜i∣∣∣ ≤ R. The attention constraints of
the consumers are strictly binding if and only if n > R. If n ≤ R then we have A˜i = I for all
consumers in the internet economy. If however n > R then we have A˜i ( I and A˜i 6= A˜h is
possible for any two consumers. In case of a binding attention constraint literally spoken only
some commodities can make it into the attention set A˜i of a consumer and the next question is
which alternatives succeed in doing so. To answer this question we need to specify a rule that
for a given I tells whether j ∈ I implies j ∈ A˜i or not. The general way to map a larger set
into a smaller one is to specify a probability distribution on the set of all possible attention sets.
Define the indicator variable z by
z = min {R,n} (1)
Let A(I, z) ⊂ P be the set of all subsets of I with size z.9 For every consumer i I now define a
function Pi on A that assigns to every possible attention set A of A with size z a probability10
of realising this particular set:
Pi : A → s|A| , A 7→ PiA (2)
where s|A| is the (|A| − 1)-dimensional simplex11 and A ∈ A is an attention set of size z. Thus
PiA is the probability that A˜i = A, i.e. PiA is the probability that consumer i perceives the
attention set A. Note that we have z = n if R ≥ n. But then we must have A = I and |A| = 1.
The only possible function satisfying (2) in this case is the unit function which gives A˜i = I for
all consumers. Hence the entire apparatus I am about to construct only comes into play when
we have n > R, i.e. when the attention constraints of the consumers bind.
Before continuing it should be noted that by definition of (2) I only allow the attention sets to
be proper sets (instead of multisets). This can be justified by the assumption that attention-
9Because by definition of the internet economy we have Ii = I for all consumers the set A of possible attention
sets is the same for all consumers. This would not be the case if we allowed for Ii 6= Ih.
10Of course, the probability of a certain set could also be one ore zero.
11s|A| ≡
{
P ∈ R|A|+ :
∑
A∈A
PiA = 1
}
.
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constrained decison-makers cannot be fooled in the sense that they always recognize and consider
R truly distinct alternatives.12
The probability pij that firm j is perceived by consumer i given that j ∈ I is calculated by
pij =
∑
A∈A
PiA 1 [j ∈ A] (3)
where 1 [j ∈ A] is a variable indicating whether alternative j is in attention set A or not. The
following proposition establishes an aggregate relationship on Pi and pij .
Proposition 1 If Pi is a probability function as defined by (2) then
∑
j∈I
pij = z.
Proof: Appendix B (8.2)
Conversely, it generally only is possible to construct Pi from the set of pij where j ∈ I in certain
trivial cases.13 The vector pAi ≡ (pij)j=1,...,n for j = 1, ..., n can be interpreted as the distribution
of attention of consumer i. Likewise, if there are ∆ consumers then the n-vector
pA ≡
∆∑
i=1
pAi
∆
is the average distribution of attention in the market. Then the j-th entry of pA corresponds to
the average fraction of consumers in the economy that consider an attention set containing j.
3.2.2 Limited attention and economic competition: the problem of the firm
From an economic perspective the function Pi becomes interesting if actions chosen by the market
agents such as advertising efforts by firms (or search efforts by consumers) affect the probability
distribution. Throughout this paper I will maintain the assumption that Pi is determined only
by the attention efforts of the firms in I. Suppose every active firm j can choose its attention
effort fj ≥ 0. I denote by f−j the vector of attention efforts chosen by all active firms other than
j. Let F ≡ (f1, ..., fn) ∈ Rn+ denote the vector of attention efforts. I assume that the attention
probabilities PA depend on F . Further, for any active firm j define the set Bj ≡ {A ∈ A : j ∈ A}.
12This means that even if a firm j by some reason has a high chance of perception, i.e.
∑
A∈A:j∈A
PiA ≈ 1, then
for R > 1 this does not mean that it is the only firm that is perceived.
13A nice property of the symmetric game is that Pi can be deduced from pij .
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Assumption 1 (Relative salience) For all consumers Pi = P where the function P is defined
by (2). If
∑
A∈Bj
PA < 1 then PA (F) is an increasing function of fj for all A ∈ Bj.
The first part of assumption 1 means that all consumers have the same function P which
determines the probability that a particular attention set A ∈ A is perceived. This assumption
is mainly for simplicity. The second part of assumption 1 means that under limited attention
(n > R) a firm can positively influence the chance that a consumers perceives an attention set
A with j ∈ A.
Lemma 1 Under assumption 1 we have for any active firm j and any consumer i that pij = pj.
If R ≥ n then pj = 1 for any active firm j. If n > R then pj = pj(fj , f−j) where pj(fj , f−j) is
an increasing function of fj if pj < 1.
Proof: Appendix B (8.3)
To formalise the interdependence of economic competition and attention competition I assume
that every firm non-cooperatively chooses one variable yj , henceforth interpreted as its price.
Let YA ≡ (yu1, ..., yuz) ∈ Rz with uk ∈ A denote the vector of prices of those firms that belong
to A. For every A ∈ A define a function V j(YA) : Rz → R1 with the property that V j(YA) = 0
if j /∈ A. Then V j(YA) is the value of attention set A to firm j and summarises the value earned
by firm j from the economic competition between the firms in attention set A. As an example
think of price competition with substitute products and linear production costs. Then
V j(YA) = (yj − c)xj (YA) (4)
where xj (YA) is the demand function of a consumer facing attention set A with price vector YA.
The second assumption I impose with the goal of eventually writing down the payoff function
of firm j is the following:
Assumption 2 (Separability) For any active firm j and any A ∈ Bj the function V j(YA) is
independent of (f1, ..., fn).
This is a very important assumption. It means that conditional on an attention set consumers
make decisions independent of all attentional activities.14 Taken to the Google example the as-
14This is a crucial difference between attention competition as understood by my contribution and persuasive
advertising: persuasive advertising would mean that the advertising effort of a firm could influence the function
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sumption means that the rank of an alternative only influences its chance of perception but does
not convey more economically relevant information to the consumer. Formally, this assump-
tion enables me to separate the competition for an attention set from the economic competition
within an attention set and leads to an analytically highly tractable structure of such a problem.
Under assumptions 1 and 2 the expected profit function of firm j is
Πj ((y1, f1), ..., (yj , fj), ..., (yn, fn)) =
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)V j(YA)∆− F − C(fj) (5)
where C(fj) denotes the cost firm j must incur under effort level fj . The properties of C will be
discussed below. The fixed setup cost F > 0 can be thought of as summarizing infrastructure
costs for production and IT.
In case of (4) the profit function (5) becomes
Πj = (yj − c)
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)xj(A)∆− F − C(fj) (6)
Concerning the costs of attention I assume the following properties to hold for f ∈ [0,∞)
C(0) = 0, C(f > 0) ∈ (0,∞), C ′(0) ∈ [0,∞), C ′(f > 0) ∈ (0,∞), C ′′(f) ∈ [0,∞) (7)
An example which provides useful later is given by
C(f) = θfη θ > 0 η ≥ 1 (8)
As the elasticity of the cost function will play a major role for the comparative statics of the
model it is appropriate to discuss the cost function in greater detail which is accomplished in
the remainder of this section. In case of sponsored search advertising firms can purchase certain
keywords (called adwords) by offering a cost-per-click (CPC) rate in an ongoing online auction.
For a purchased keyword the rank of the link within the frame for sponsored ads depends on
the relative bid and on the PageRank measure of the page15. Thus for a given set of keywords
and identifying attention probabilities with the on-screen ranking we might expect constant unit
V j . Attention competition means that the chance of perception depends on firm actions but has no further
influence on the choice behavior of consumers.
15In case of Google the CPC corresponds to the next highest bid plus one cent.
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costs to be reasonable. Imagine a situation where all initial bids are the same for a fixed set
of keywords. Assuming that only relative bids determine the ranking the on-screen position
then is random and the probability to be among the first R ranks is R/n for every competitor.
Then if all competitors double their bids my firm can get the same chance as before (R/n) only
if I also double my bid which simply implies doubling advertising expenditure. However, as
Williamson and Rusmevichientong point out, sponsored search advertising is highly complex as
it is a multidimensional issue if the set of keywords is not fixed and novel keywords are associated
with an unknown number of click-through rates (Williamson and Rusmevichientong (2006), p.
260). Nonlinear costs of attention may arise e.g. if retrieving new click-generating keywords
gets more difficult the more keywords are already employed. Nonlinearity is more generally also
supported by the finding of Nothdurft that it gets increasingly difficult to generate a higher
salience (pop-up effect) of some visual stimulus at higher levels of salience (Nothdurft (2000), p.
1195): combining the salience of two features (e.g. color and movement of a visual object) does
not lead to the sum of the saliences of the two features for the same background. Finally, in case
of adword competition how narrow the set of possible keywords is might be a market-specific
feature which then implies different elasticities of the cost functions for different markets. The
market for a specialised set of screwdrivers might encompass less critical keywords than the
market of holiday destinations.
3.3 The symmetric price-attention game
Let Sy ≡ [c, ymax], Sf ≡ [0,∞) and S ≡ [c, ymax]×[0,∞). Further, I assume (5) to be symmetric,
i.e.
Πj ((y1, f1), ..., (yj , fj), ..., (yn, fn)) = Π
σ(j)
(
(yσ(1), fσ(1)), ..., (yσ(j), fσ(j)), ..., (yσ(n), fσ(n))
)
where σ is a permutation of {1, ..., n} All active firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose their strategy, the pair (yj , fj) ∈ S in order to maximize (5) and take (y−j , f−j) as given.
Hence (n, Sn,Π) is a static symmetric game. In the main part of this paper I restrict myself to
the case of symmetric equilibria.16 To establish a symmetric equilibrium I apply the symmetric
opponents form approach. In the next section I derive the symmetric opponent form of (5).
It is convenient to impose all further assumptions relevant for the analysis of the symmetric
16Appendix A explores the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric game.
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equilibrium directly on the symmetric opponent form.
3.3.1 The symmetric opponent form
To derive the symmetric opponent form of the profit function of (5) I take firm j as the rep-
resentative firm and set yj = y and yg = y¯ as well as fj = f and fg = f¯ for any g 6= j. Then
V j(A) = V j(A′) if A,A′ ∈ Bj and I define V (y, y¯, z) ≡ V j (YA : A ∈ Bj) (remember that the
number of arguments in V j is z) and17
p
(
f, f¯ , n,R
) ≡
 1 n ≤ Rpj(f, f−j)|fg=f¯ ∀ g 6=j n > R
Lemma 2 If n > R the symmetric opponent form of (5) is
Π(y, f) = p(f, f¯ , n,R)V (y, y¯, R) ∆− F − C(f) (9)
If R ≥ n the symmetric opponent form of (5) is
Π(y, f) = V (y, y¯, n) ∆− F − C(f) (10)
Proof: Appendix B (8.4)
Note that p(f, f¯ , n,R)∆ is the fraction of consumers which perceive firm j. That is, p(f, f¯ , n,R)∆
is the number of realised attention sets A˜ that contain j.
Because C(f) is an injective function of f it is possible to rewrite (9) directly in terms of
attention costs rather than in terms of attention effort f . For f = ρ(ω) with C (ρ(ω)) = ω and
f¯ = ρ(ω¯) with C (ρ(ω¯)) = ω¯ we get
Π(y, ω) = p (ρ(ω), ρ(ω¯), n,R)V (y, y,R)∆− F − ω
This reformulation makes sense as firms rather observe attention costs than attention effort of
their opponents. However, it is convenient to solve the model in terms of effort f rather than
in terms of attention cost and I continue to use this specification.
17For R < n the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) generally depends on R because there are |A| =
(
n
R
)
possible attention
sets and the probability assignment as defined by (2) depends on how many attention sets there are.
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It is possible to establish a simple relationship between the probability p that firm j is perceived
by a consumer and the probability, p¯, that one of its opponents is perceived. Let pg be the
probability that g 6= j is perceived by a consumer. Then fg = f¯ for all g 6= j implies that pg = p¯
for all g 6= j.18 Proposition 1 shows that
p¯ =
R− p
n− 1 R < n (3’)
3.3.2 Assumptions on the symmetric opponent form
In this section I impose and discuss the main assumption on the value function V (y, y¯, z) and
the probability function p(f, f¯ , n,R). I take these assumptions to be satisfied in the main part
of this paper.
Assumption 3 The function V (y, y¯, z) is twice continuously differentiable in y, y¯ for y, y¯ ∈ Sy
and decreasing in z. V2(y, y¯, z) > 0.
The assumption V2(y, y¯, z) > 0 means that higher prices of the opponents ceteris paribus increase
the revenue that the firm can extract from its attention sets. In case of (4) this means that
higher prices of the opponents ceteris paribus increases demand (as the opponents loose some
consumers to the firm) and hence also revenue for the firm. The assumption that V (y, y¯, z)
decreases in z means that if consumers perceive more alternatives then ceteris paribus the firm
earns less value from the consumer. In case of (4) a standard intuition for this is that consumers
allocate their budget over the set of all firms they perceive. If they perceive more firms then, for
a fixed budget v, they divide their budget over more firms which leaves less budget for a single
firm.
As an example for a function that satisfies assumption 3 suppose consumers have CES-preferences
over all z commodities they perceive and c > 0. Then it is straightforward to show that
V (y, y¯, z) = (y − c) vy
−σ
y1−σ + (z − 1)y¯1−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(y,y¯,z)
(11)
18Moreover, if we know p(f, f¯ , n) then we can determine PA(F) for all A ∈ Bj as well as PA′(F) where A′ /∈ Bj
(see the remark in section 8.4 of the appendix). This means that, if we restrict ourselves to the symmetric
opponent form, whenever we determine p(f, f¯ , n) then the probability set function P is also determined which
means that every possible attention set A ∈ A has a well defined probability of being realised.
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where x(y, y¯, z) denotes demand of a consumer for commodity j who perceives j and also z − 1
other firms. The parameter σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution19 and v > 0 is a
consumer’s budget.
Assumption 4 Let p ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of firm j of being in the attention set of a
consumer.
a)
p = p
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
(12)
If n > R, f, f¯ > 0 and p < 1 then the following properties of the function p
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
are
postulated:
b) p
(
λf, λf¯ , n,R
)
= p
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
for λ > 0.
c) p
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
is twice continuously differentiable in f , f¯ and
p1(f, f¯ , n,R) > 0 p11(f, f¯ , n,R) < 0 p2(f, f¯ , n,R) < 0
Moreover, p(f, f¯ , n,R) is strictly increasing in R and strictly decreasing in n.
Because of assumption c) p(f, f¯ , n,R) is an increasing strongly concave function of f . Note that
p1 > 0 directly follows from lemma 1 if we assume the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) to be differentiable
in f . The assumption that p2 < 0 means that attention efforts impose a negative externality
of senders on each other.20 The assumption that p(f, f¯ , n,R) is strictly increasing in R means
that the probability to be perceived ceteris paribus increases with the size of the attention set
which is intuitively clear: if people perceive more (less) alternatives then, ceteris paribus, the
probability of a single firm to be perceived should increase (decrease). Similarly, the assumption
that p(f, f¯ , n,R) decreases in n means that if there are more (less) active firms then, ceteris
paribus, the chance of a single firm to be perceived should decrease (increase).
19V2(y, y¯, z) > 0 follows because σ > 1.
20Generally, a positive effect of aggregate attention effort, Σ =
n∑
j=1
fj on a market could be imagined if ∆ were
not exogenously fixed but depends on Σ. Think of a market where by some reason fierce attention competition
between the firms for those consumers that are already aware of the market leads to a high Σ. But this may
imply that information about the market leads to a strong general coverage in the media which may attract new
consumers to that market without the firms explicitly wooing them. If there is an aggregate effect of attention
competition in the sense that louder markets attract more consumers (have a higher ∆) then attention driven
spillover effects between markets may exist. This is the subject of my mimeo ”Attention markets”.
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If n > R and all active firms choose the same effort level f then the probability of being perceived
by a consumer is the same for all firms:
Lemma 3 If n > R and f = f¯ then p = p¯ = R/n.
Proof: f = f¯ implies p = p¯. The result then follows immediately from (3’).

3.3.3 An example: The Attention Contest Function
In this section I present an important example of a function p(f, f¯ , n,R) that satisfies assumption
4. Besides having a nice intuition this function also has some analytically convenient properties.
Let
p(f, f¯ , n,R) = 1−
R∏
i=1
(
1− f
f + (n− i)f¯
)
(13)
Throughout this paper I refer to (13) as the (symmetric) Attention Contest Function (ACF).
Proposition 2 The symmetric ACF satisfies all properties from assumption 4.
Proof: Appendix B (8.5)
Note that we cannot partially differentiate the ACF as stated in (13) with respect to R because
the function is not continuous in R.21
The remainder of this section provides an intuitive derivation of the ACF. The following deriva-
tion is from the perspective of firm j. Let
Fn =
fj
n∑
k=1
fk
(14)
measure the relative effort of firm j. Now assume that getting a consumer’s attention can be
described by a stochastic process similar to making random draws without repetition in a simple
urn model. Hence the consumer will draw R times from this urn which corresponds to selecting
R different alternatives. Firm j is in the attention set of a consumer if it gets either the first, the
second ... or the R-th draw. Fn corresponds to the probability of getting the first of the R draws.
21It is formally possible to extend (13) to a continuous function in R by using a Gamma function expansion.
See the appendix for details.
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This probability depends (positively) on the mass of firm j’s ball (fj) versus the aggregate mass
of all balls in the urn (
n∑
k=1
fk). If fk = f¯ and fj = f then (14) becomes
22
Fn =
f
f + (n− 1)f¯
and 1− Fn corresponds to the probability of not getting the first draw. Similarly,
(1− Fn)(1− Fn−1) =
(
1− f
f + (n− 1)f¯
)(
1− f
f + (n− 2)f¯
)
is the probability of not getting the first and second draw (which obviously never is larger than
1 − Fn) and generally
R∏
i=1
(1− F1+n−i) is the probability of not getting any of the R draws.
Consequently, the probability of being in one of the R draws is given by (13).
3.3.4 Best response of the representative firm
In this section I discuss and illustrate the best-response function of the representative firm.
Suppose that n > R. Assuming an interior solution the two first-order conditions of (9) are
V1(y, y¯, R) = 0
p1
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
∆V (y, y¯, R) = C ′(f)
(15)
From (15) we see that y = y(y¯, R) and f = f(f¯ , y¯, n,R,∆). This means that the strategic choice
of price of our firm is independent of attention efforts but it depends on the perceived market
size (R) and not on the total amount of information that a consumer receives (which is |I| = n).
Also note that f depends on n because the marginal probability of perception depends on n
and f depends on R because both the marginal probability and the value function V depend
on R. This will have an important consequence for the comparative statics of the symmetric
equilibrium later. Because the marginal probability of perception decreases in f (assumption 4)
and V2(y, y¯, R) > 0 (assumption 3) we immediately get f
′(∆) > 0 and also f ′(y¯) > 0.23 More
consumers (a larger audience) means more potential budgets which increases the marginal value
of attention and leads to a higher effort level. Similarly, if y¯ increases this means that our firm
22In Appendix A (7.1) I discuss the ACF without imposing fk = f¯ . This is technically necessary when dealing
with the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
23f ′(y¯) = p1V2∆
C′′−p11V∆ > 0
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can earn more value from every attention set that it is contained in which increases the marginal
value of attention and hence also effort level f . In the CES-example (11) we get y′(y¯) > 0 and
also y′(R) < 0 (see section 8.6, Part I, for the calculations). The last result means that, because
consumers are less attentive, our firm sets a higher price and originates from the fact that if a
consumer has a fixed budget but perceives less commodities then he spends his funds over fewer
firms. This means that, ceteris paribus, the demand for the commodity of our firm increases
and the optimal action of the firm then is to exploit this by setting a higher price.24 How does
f depend on f¯? Formally, the answer to this question depends on how f¯ affects the marginal
chance of perception p1(f, f¯ , n,R):
f ′(f¯) =
p12(f, f¯ , n,R)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
V (y, y¯, R)∆
C ′′(f)− p11(f, f¯ , n,R)V (y, y¯, R)∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Intuitively, we could imagine f¯ to have a complementary effect on f by a defensive-type of
argument: if all opponents increase their effort level then the representative firm must also
increase its effort level in order to remain salient. But we could also expect that more ”noise”
means that it gets more difficult for our firm to influence its chance of perception. In such a
case we would expect that p1(f, f¯ , n,R) decreases in f¯ . It turns out that the ACF incorporates
both features which implies a non-monotonic relationship between f¯ and f . Figure 4 depicts f
as a function of f¯ and n in case of the ACF with R = 2 and cost function25 (8). What these
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Figure 4: ACF (n = 10 left, f¯ = 1 right)
24Note that such an effect cannot exist in Falkinger’s model of limited attention (which also uses the CES
demand function) as firms have no mass and the price does not depend on the measure of the perceived market
size (Falkinger (2008)).
25I impose V (y, y¯, 2)∆ = 10, θ = 1 and η = 2. The pictures do not change qualitatively if other numerical
values are used (or if R > 2).
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pictures generally tell us is that with the ACF if there is little aggregate attentional activity of
the opponents (”low noise”), because f¯ is small or n is small (close to R), then f increases in
the noise whereas if the level of noise is already high then the opposite occurs.
4 Existence of a symmetric equilibrium
In this section I derive the conditions which assert the existence of exactly one symmetric
equilibrium in the price-attention game as described in section 3.3. I start with the case where
n is given exogenously and then proceed to the case where n is endogenously determined by the
free-entry condition of the two-stage game. I show that the CES-ACF example has exactly one
symmetric equilibrium.
4.1 Symmetric equilibrium for exogenous n
The fundamentals of the symmetric game are the parameter set {n,R,∆}, the cost function
C(f), the value function V (y, y¯, z) with z = min {R,n} as defined by assumption 3 and the
probability function p(f, f¯ , n,R) as defined by assumption 4. In a symmetric equilibrium all
n firms choose the same strategy (y, f). To find a symmetric equilibrium we can rely on the
SOFA.
Suppose that n > R. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions of the represen-
tative firm’s optimisation problem are given by (15). Then, a solution (y, f) to
V1(y, y,R) = 0
p1 (f, f, n,R) ∆V (y, y,R) = C
′(f)
(16)
corresponds to an interior symmetric equilibrium of the game.
If R ≥ n then it is easy to see from (10) and (7) that a symmetric equilibrium (y, f) of the game
with y ∈ (c, ymax) must have f = 0 and satisfies V1(y, y, n) = 0.
To summarise: for given R,n > 1 and ∆ > 0 a symmetric equilibrium (y, f) of the price-attention
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game satisfies
V1(y, y, z) = 0
f :
 p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′(f) = 0 R < nf = 0 R ≥ n
z = min {R,n}
(17)
Assumption 5 a) The following boundary conditions are satisfied:
i) For any z > 1 we have V1(c, c, z) > 0 and V1(y
max, ymax, z) < 0.
ii) If n > R we have lim
f→0
p1(f, f, n,R) =∞ and lim
f→∞
p1(f, f, n,R) = 0
b) For any z > 1 and y ∈ (c, ymax) we have V (y, y, z) ∈ (0,∞), V11(y, y, z) < 0 and26
V1(y, y, z) = 0 ⇒ − ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, z)) > 0 (18)
c) For any R > 1 and any n with n > R and f ∈ (0,∞)
− ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)) > 0 (19)
The boundary conditions exclude the possibility of symmetric boundary equilibria which simpli-
fies the comparative-static analysis later. The assumptions of monotony (18) and (19) exclude
the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 3 If assumption 5 is satisfied then for any R,n > 1 there exists a unique vector
(y, f) that solves (17). Hence there exists only one symmetric equilibrium. In the equilibrium
we have y ∈ (c, ymax). If R ≥ n we have f = 0 and y = y(n). If n > R then y = y(R) and
f = f(n,R,∆) ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: Appendix B (8.7)
Hence if R ≥ n then all active firms choose the minimal effort level f = 0. Because in this
case the consumer perceives all alternatives he is informed of there is no benefit from choosing
a higher level of f .
26Note that ∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, z)) = V11(y, y, z) + V12(y, y, z), i.e.
∂
∂y
(V1(y, y, z)) is the total derivative of V1(y, y, z)
with respect to y. Similarly, ∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)) is that total derivative of p1(f, f, n,R) with respect to f .
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A nice property of the ACF is that this functional form for p(f, f¯ , n,R) satisfies the boundary
conditions in assumption 5 as well as condition (19).
Lemma 4 Suppose n > R and the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF (13). Then for
f > 0
p1(f, f, n,R) =
n−R
nf
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (20)
The ACF satisfies assumption 5. A good approximation to (20) if n is large relative to R is
given by
p1(f, f, n,R) ∼= n−R
n2f
R (21)
Proof: Appendix B (8.8)
Almost all results in this paper are proved by using (20) and not its approximation. In any
case the results hold also if (21) were used instead and the proofs usually are less technical.
In applications we can use (21) rather than (20) because (21) is differentiable also in R and
generally simpler to work with. Because the ACF satisfies assumption 5 then whenever we
combine the ACF with a function V (y, y,R) that satisfies assumption 5 we always end up with
a single symmetric equilibrium (for n > R).
Corollary 1 If for n > R the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF and V (y, y,R) sat-
isfies assumption 5 then there exists exactly one symmetric equilibrium (y, f) ∈ Int(S). f is
approximately determined by
n−R
n2f
R∆V (y, y,R) = C ′(f) (22)
Proof: Follows from proposition 3, lemma 4 and (21).

4.2 Free-entry equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
In the symmetric equilibrium the level of profits is determined by
Π(y, f, n) =
 ∆V (y, y, n)− F − C(f) n ≤ RR
n∆V (y, y,R)− F − C(f) n > R
(23)
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for any given R > 1. The entry game then is a two-stage game where firms first decide whether or
not to enter. A firm that chooses to enter pays the fixed costs F > 0. All firms that chose to enter
then play the symmetric price-attention game from the last section. In a pure subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) given any decision in the first stage a Nash equilibrium follows in the second
stage. In a free-entry equilibrium each active firm makes non-negative profits (Π(n) ≥ 0) and
further entry would result in negative profits (Π(n+ 1) < 0). Concerning the Nash-equilibrium
of the second stage we already know that for any given n,R > 1 there exists a single symmetric
equilibrium. Ignoring the integer-value problem of n the free-entry equilibrium (y, f, n) then is
described by
V1 (y, y,min {R,n}) = 0 (24)
f :
 p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′(f) = 0 R < nf = 0 R ≥ n (25)
Π(f, y, n) = 0 (26)
With symmetry we can only hope to determine n, the number of active firms in a SPE and
not which firm enters and which firm stays out. I call a SPE unique if there only is one vector
(y, f, n) that solves (24) - (26). The fundamentals of the symmetric game with free entry are the
parameter set {R,∆}, the cost function C(f), the value function V (y, y¯, z) with z = min {R,n}
as defined by assumption 3 and the probability function p(f, f¯ , n,R) as defined by 4.
Assumption 6 The following properties are imposed:
a) The function V (y, y, z) is twice continuously differentiable in z and V3 < 0 as well as
V13 < 0.
b) The function p1(f, f, n,R) is continuously differentiable in n
c) For f > 0 we have lim
n→R+
p1(f, f, n,R) = 0
The assumption V3(y, y, z) < 0 is just the differentiable version of assumption 3 and the last
assumption means that the marginal value of an attention set decreases if more alternatives are
being considered. Let yˆ be implicitly defined by V1(yˆ, yˆ, 2) = 0.
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Proposition 4 Let 2 ≤ R <∞. Suppose that assumptions 5 and 6 are satisfied and
∆V (yˆ, yˆ, 2)/F ≥ 1 (27)
If the condition
∂
∂f (p1(f, f, n,R))
p1(f, f, n,R)
< p13(f, f, n,R)
n2
R
(28)
holds then the free-entry game has a single symmetric SPE (y, f, n) with 2 ≤ n <∞
Proof: Appendix B (8.9)
To understand intuitively why condition (28) excludes the possibility of multiple symmetric
equilibria note that (28) is satisfied if p13 > 0. Suppose that p13 > 0 holds for any n > n
′ and
assume that (y′, f ′, n′) is an equilibrium of the free-entry game with n′ > R. From (16) it is not
difficult to see that p13 > 0 implies that f
′(n) > 0 for n ≥ n′. That is, equilibrium attention
effort increases if we exogenously increase n. From (23) we see that an exogenous increase of n
has two effects on the value of Π(y(n), f(n), n): equilibrium profits decrease in n because R/n
decreases in n. This is the direct effect of n on the profit level and originates from the fact
that more senders means that equilibrium chances of being perceived decrease for a single firm
which means less (expected) revenue. But there also is an indirect effect on the level of profits
because C(f) depends on n in the equilibrium. f ′(n) > 0 implies that attention costs increase
in n which means that profits decrease in n also over this channel. Thus we see that p13 > 0
unambiguously implies profits to decrease in n for n > n′. But as we have n′ in the free-entry
equilibrium this means that profits must be negative for any n > n′. Consequently, there cannot
exist a free-entry equilibrium with n > n′. This is illustrated in the left picture of figure 5. If
n' n0
 yn , f n , n
n ' n
 yn , f n , n
Multiple symmetric equilibria
0
Figure 5: The possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria under limited attention
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however we have p13 < 0 then the indirect effect of a change of n on profits is positive as a
higher n means lower f and thus lower costs C(f). If this indirect effect is very strong then
profits might also increase in n. In this case we might have multiple symmetric equilibria as is
illustrated in the right picture of figure 5.
A very nice property of the ACF is that condition (28) holds.
Corollary 2 Let 2 ≤ R <∞. The ACF (see (20)) satisfies assumption 6. If V (y, y, z) satisfies
assumptions 5 and 6, the function p (f, f, n,R) is given by the ACF and condition (27) holds
then the free-entry game has a single symmetric SPE (y, f, n) with 2 ≤ n <∞
Proof: The ACF satisfies assumption 5 because of lemma 4. It is not hard to see that the ACF
also satisfies b) and c) of assumption 6. Finally, the ACF also satisfies condition (28) (see lemma
7 in the appendix (8.1)). The claim then follows from proposition 4.

4.3 The ACF-CES example
Suppose that n > R is given exogenously. If p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF and V (y, y¯, z)
by the CES example (11) then exactly one symmetric equilibrium (y, f) exists and is approxi-
mately27 determined by (see 8.6, Part II, for the calculations)
y = c+
cR
(R− 1)(σ − 1) (29)
(n−R)Rv∆
fn2(1 + (R− 1)σ) = C
′(f) (30)
Moreover, we have
V (y, y, z) =
y − c
y
v
z
(31)
Hence V3 < 0 and V13 < 0 hold. Suppose that V (yˆ, yˆ, 2) =
v∆
1+σ ≥ F . Then by corollary 2
we may conclude that in the ACF-CES example there exists exactly one symmetric SPE with
n ≥ 2.
27Note that (29) is exact and (30) follows from using (21).
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5 Comparative statics
In this section I discuss the comparative-static results of the symmetric price-attention equi-
librium. I begin with an exogenous number of firms and then proceed to the case where n is
determined endogenously in a free-entry equilibrium. I always take assumptions 5 and 6 to be
satisfied. I extend the cost function from (7) by a parameter α, i.e. C = C(f, α) with the
property that C2(f, α) > 0 and C12(f, α) > 0. For notational simplicity I set C
′ ≡ C1(f, α) and
C ′′ ≡ C11(f, α).
5.1 Comparative statics for an exogenous number of firms
In this section I derive the comparative statics of the symmetric price-attention game where n
is given exogenously. I only discuss the case where n > R is given exogenously. The equilib-
rium conditions are given by (16). The game has the following set of exogenous parameters:
{R,n,∆, F, α}.
Proposition 5 The comparative statics of (16) are given by y = y(R−
) and f = f(R
?
, n
?
,∆
+
, α−).
Proof: Appendix B (8.10)
The only parameter that matters for equilibrium prices is the size of the attention set. y′(R) < 0
results because V13(y, y,R) < 0. This assumption means that the equilibrium marginal value
that can be earned from an attention set decreases if people compare more alternatives. This is
a very intuitive assumption and many examples (such as the CES example) satisfy this property.
In the CES case this follows because consumers spend their fixed budget v over more alternatives
if they perceive a larger set which means that less budget is available for the single firm. To offset
this loss of demand the best-response is to decrease the price which explains why equilibrium
prices are lower if the perceived market is larger.
However, the fact that y is determined only by the perceived market size and does not depend on
other parameters implies that the aggregate level of attention competition nf (e.g. advertising
intensity) observed may be a bad predictor of market power. Suppose we have two almost
identical economies E1 = {R,n,∆, F, α1} and E2 = {R,n,∆, F, α2} with α1 > α2. Then nf1 <
nf2. The classical theory of informative advertising holds that higher aggregate advertising
levels should deteriorate market power of the firms which in equilibrium manifests itself in lower
prices. The intuition behind this theory is that limited information of consumers because of
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scarce information leaves the firm with market power (see Goeree (2008)). In such a case means
to increase advertising intensity would be beneficial for consumers as competition is reinforced
and prices are decreased. We see that under limited attention this conjecture does not hold as
consumers have limited information because of their limited attention capacities and not because
of scarce information.
Search models usually predict lower equilibrium prices if search costs are reduced and electronic
marketplaces or the internet with its powerful search engines are generally thought of dramat-
ically lowering the search costs (e.g. Bakos (1997)). In such models this usually means that
people become aware of more (or better) alternatives. However, in many cases the anticipated
price-reduction was a lot smaller as suggested by these models (Ellison and Ellison (2005),
p.149) or on the contrary online prices even were found to be higher than offline prices (e.g.
Lee (1998)). The model of this paper provides an explanation why such gaps between theory
and empirics exist. Search models do not distinguish the information set from the attention
set. If we agree to V13 < 0 then larger attention sets will always imply lower prices in such
models. If however the attention set is a subset of the information set with fixed size then larger
information sets have no (or at least less) impact on equilibrium prices. The massive evidence
on top-rank clicking-behaviour and also on the fact that people often do not use more than one
search query (e.g. Jansen et al. (2000), p. 212) means that people concentrate their decision
on just a few alternatives which suggests that not search cost theories but an attention theory
adequately models the contemporaneous and future information problems.
As is shown in the appendix (see 8.10) we have sign(f ′(n)) = sign (p13) and sign (f ′(R)) =
sign
(
p1V2V13 − ∂∂y (V (y, y,R)) (p14V + p1V3)
)
. These expressions cannot be signed without
further assumptions. In case of a change of R there are two effects at work28. First, a decrease
of R increases the equilibrium value of an attention set because i) an attention set must be shared
with fewer competitors and ii) equilibrium prices are higher29. This set value effect increases the
marginal revenue of attention and increases attention levels f . Second, the marginal probability
of attention also depends on R. Depending on the sign of p14 the effect of R on p1 may either
reinforce or offset the set value effect. A sufficient condition for f ′(R) < 0 is that p14Rp1 <
−V3R
V
holds in equilibrium. If V (y, y,R) = V˜ (y)/R with V˜ (y)′ > 0 then30 the RHS of this inequality
28Recall the discussion of strategic behavior in section 3.3.4
29Formally: dV
dy
= V3 + V2y
′(R) < 0.
30This is a property that many demand functions share, e.g. demand derived from the circular ideal variety
model. Also the CES example has this property: V (y, y,R) = v(y−c)
Ry
= (y−c)
y
v
R
.
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is one. As for the ACF p1(f, f, n,R) is a strongly concave function of R which goes through the
origin (see (21) in case of the approximation and lemma 6 in the appendix for the general case)
we may conclude that f ′(R) < 0 in such a case because p14Rp1 < 1. Hence less attention implies
higher prices and higher effort levels (stronger attention competition) in this example.
Suppose now that n increases exogenously. We see that the sign of f ′(n) depends entirely on
how the marginal probability p1 depends on n. This is different from the case of an exogenous
change of R as a change of n has no set value effect. In case of the ACF it can be shown (see
7 in the appendix (8.1)) that p1(f, f, n,R) is a hump-shaped function of n. Consequently, f(n)
takes on a hump-shaped form in this example.
Summarising, we see that limited attention implies equilibrium prices to be independent of
the size of the information set (n) which is different from models of informative advertising.
In equilibrium, prices reflect the scarcity of attention in the sense that smaller attention sets
mean higher prices. On the other side limited attention implies that a competition for attention
emerges (f > 0 if n > R). If consumers are less attentive this means that the firms can earn
higher values. But this makes attention more valuable for the firms which tends to increase
attention levels - and attention costs. In case of the ACF this is the dominant effect which
means that less attention always leads to higher attention costs. In this case we have two effects
on profits if consumers are more inattentive: i) the set value effect which states that more
inattention (lower R) increases profits and ii) the fact that, because getting attention is more
valuable, the competition for attention is reinforced and leads to higher attention costs.
In the next section I investigate the implications of these two conflictive effects for the equilibrium
number of firms that survive the price-attention competition.
5.2 Comparative statics in the free-entry game
In this section I discuss the consequences of limited attention for the equilibrium (y, f, n) of
the free-entry game. The equilibrium conditions are given by (23) - (26). The game has the
following set of exogenous parameters: {R,∆, F, α}. In the entire section I assume that (27)
and (28) are satisfied and R ≥ 2. To understand intuitively how n depends on the these
parameters it is sufficient to understand how the profit function depends on the parameters
because sign (Π′(χ)) = sign (n′(χ)) for χ ∈ {R,∆, F, α}
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5.2.1 Comparative statics and conditions for endogenous limited attention
An attention equilibrium (an equilibrium with n > R) occurs endogenously in the free-entry
game if the system
V1(y˜, y˜, n˜) = 0
∆V (y˜, y˜, n˜)− F = 0
(32)
has a solution (y˜, n˜) with n˜ > R. If n˜ ≤ R then (y˜, 0, n˜) corresponds to the equilibrium of the
game; a conventional equilibrium occurs. If n˜ > R then there cannot be a conventional symmet-
ric equilibrium. But as exactly one symmetric equilibrium exists this implies that an attention
equilibrium must occur. To illustrate the situation graphically note that n˜ = n˜(∆, F ) = R
for fixed R ≥ 2 implies that d∆dF = − n˜2(∆,F )n˜1(∆,F ) . If the Implicit Function Theorem is applied to
(32) it is straightforward to show that d∆dF =
1
V (y˜,y˜,n˜) > 0. Figure 6 illustrates the situation.
In the figure we see that lower infrastructure costs F or a higher market potential ∆ rather
F
V  y , y ,2
F

n=R
nR nR
Figure 6: Attention equilibrium or conventional equilibrium?
impose that an attention equilibrium occurs (n˜ > R). Generally, the conditions that imply an
attention equilibrium are very similar to the conditions that imply an information-rich economy
in Falkinger’s model (Falkinger (2008), p. 1604-1605). If we use the CES-example we gain two
further parameters: consumer budget v > 0 and the elasticity of substitution σ > 1. Suppose
that V (yˆ, yˆ, 2)∆ = v∆1+σ ≥ F . Then v∆ > F . It is an easy exercise to solve (32) in the CES case
for n˜:
n˜ =
v∆
Fσ
+
σ − 1
σ
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Hence we have n˜′(v) > 0 and n˜′(σ) = F−v∆
Fσ2
< 0. This means that if the consumers have a
higher budget or the commodities are less substitutable then an attention equilibrium is more
likely to occur.
5.2.2 Comparative statics for limited attention equilibria
In this section I discuss the comparative statics of the symmetric free entry equilibrium if an
attention equilibrium occurs endogenously. As in the previous section the comparative statics
can be signed unambiguously in many cases if the function p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF31.
I show that both f and n increase in the market potential ∆. This means that aggregate
attention costs nC(f) also increase in market potential which is consistent with the US-data
on the number of consumers and advertising expenditure. Moreover, I show that an increase
of the cost parameter α has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium number of firms. A positive
relationship between equilibrium profits and the cost parameter α is possible which means that
higher costs of attention could lead to a higher number of active firms which is an interesting
result. Finally, I show that under the ACF the effects of the attention parameter R on f are
negative also under free entry, but the effects on n are ambiguous and depend crucially on how
much more value can be earned from less attentive consumers compared to how much attention
costs increase because of the higher efforts to attract attention.
To simplify notation I set V ′′ ≡ ∂∂y (V1(y, y,R)) and p′′ ≡ ∂∂f (p1(f, f, n,R)). For the general
calculations see the appendix (8.11).
Effects of limited attention on prices
Consider two economies E1 = {R,∆1, F1, α1} and E2 = {R,∆2, F2, α2}. Assume parameter
values such that in the free entry equilibria of these economies we have n1 > R > n2. Hence in
economy one an attention equilibrium occurs whereas in economy two a conventional equilibrium
occurs. Then it is straightforward to verify that y1 = y1(R) but y2 = y2(F2
+
,∆2−
). This difference
occurs because in an attention equilibrium the competitive entry effect on prices is absent. As
in the last section we have y′1(R) < 0.
The sign of f ′(∆) and n′(∆)
We know from the last section that the f(n) equilibrium locus can be non-monotonic because of
31See lemma 7 in the appendix (8.1) for the properties of the ACF.
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p13(f, f, n,R) Q 0 and hence the comparative statics of f in the case of free-entry is not ex ante
clear. It can be shown that sign (f ′(∆)) = sign
(
p1(f,f,n,R)
n + p13(f, f, n,R)
)
. That is the sign
of f ′(n) depends (positively) on the direct effect of ∆ on the marginal value of perception but
also on how the marginal probability of perception depends on n. In case of the ACF it can be
shown that f ′(∆) > 0 (see 7). Thus if the market potential increases so does the competition for
attention. Further the ACF implies n′(∆) > 0 because sign (n′(∆)) = sign
(−Rn p′′ − p21 + ωn)
which is unambiguously positive (see 7). Hence with the ACF the direct effect on equilibrium
profits of a higher market potential always dominates the increase of the costs of attention
competition. We know from the data that the number of US-consumers doubled from 1950 -
2005. At the same time advertising expenditure more than doubled. This is in line with the
comparative static predictions of my model as both f and n increase with ∆ under the ACF.
Hence aggregate advertising expenditure nC(f) (or nF + nC(f)) unambiguously increases if ∆
increases.32
The sign of f ′(F ) and n′(F )
We always have n′(F ) < 0 unambiguously. In case of the ACF we have that f depends in a
hump-shaped way on F because sign (f ′(F )) = sign (−p13). The different ways in which ∆
and F affect f under free-entry originate in the fact that ∆ also positively affects the marginal
revenue of attention which increases f . In the case of a change of F attention efforts are only
affected by the change of n according to the entry or exit decisions and we know from the last
section that f(n) is hump-shaped with the ACF.
The sign of f ′(α) and n′(α)
Let ε ≡ p′′fp1 < 0, µ ≡
C′′f
C′ ≥ 0 and β ≡ C12fC2 > 0. Suppose that p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF.
Then it is straightforward to show (use lemma 7 b)) that a sufficient condition for f ′(α) < 0 is
given by β + ε ≥ 0. In case of the ACF we have ε = −1 (see the proof of 7 b)). Hence if β ≥ 1
then f ′(α) < 0. If the cost function is of the type C(f, α) = αc(f) then the sufficient condition
for f ′(α) < 0 reduces to c
′(f)f
c(f) ≥ 1. But c(0) = 0, c′(f) > 0 and c′′(f) ≥ 0 imply c
′(f)f
c(f) ≥ 1.
Hence the ACF together with C(f, α) = αc(f) unambiguously imply that f ′(α) < 0. Further, it
is possible to show that sign(n′(α)) = sign(µ− ε− β) which is ambiguous. Hence it is possible
to have n′(α) > 0, which means that increasing costs of attention might imply a higher number
32The same holds in the CES example if consumer budget v increases. See section 5.2.3.
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of active firms and is an interesting result. This occurs if the reduction of f , due to the higher
marginal costs of attention, lead to lower equilibrium attention costs at the firm level. With the
ACF and C(f, α) = αc(f) we get sign(n′(α)) = sign(µ + 1 − β). If c(f) = fη and η ≥ 1 then
we have µ = η− 1 and β = η. Thus in this case n′(α) = 0. Hence in this example α affects only
the level of f but has no effect on the equilibrium number of active firms.
The sign of f ′(R) and n′(R)
A decrease in R (consumers are more inattentive) leads to higher value of the attention sets
and thus also to a higher marginal return on attention which increases f . But the marginal
probability to make it into the attention set also depends on R. It is possible to determine the
sign of f ′(R) unambiguously if we use the ACF and assume that V (y, y,R) = V˜ (y)/R. Then
we get
sign
(
f ′(R)
)
= sign
(
V13RV2
(
p13 +
p1
n
)
− V
′′V˜ (y)
n
(
p14 − p1
R
))
and hence f ′(R) < 0 follows unambiguously also with endogenous limited attention (because
p14 − p1R < 0 and p13 + p1n > 0, see lemmata 6 and 7 in the appendix).
To discuss the effect of limited attention on the equilibrium number of firms I set V (y, y,R) =
V˜ (y)/R and C(f) ≡ θfη with θ > 0 and η ≥ 1. Then with (21) the two equilibrium equations
(25) and (26) become
n−R
n2η
∆V˜ (y) = C(f)
∆V˜ (y)
n = F + C(f)
(33)
Regarding the n(R)-locus two conflictive effects can be eyeballed from the second equation of (33)
which originate from the interaction between attention competition and economic competition.
First, as less attentive consumers compare fewer alternatives this loosens price competition which
leads to higher equilibrium prices and higher revenues (see lemma 5). Hence by the revenue effect
we would expect profits and thus n to increase under limited attention. Second, because getting
attention is of more value to firms, the competition for attention is intensified (f ′(R) < 0) and
attention costs increase. Thus the cost effect suggests n to decrease under limited attention.
Manipulation of (33) shows that a single equation determines n(R):
∆V˜ (y(R))
n2η
(n(η − 1) +R) = F (34)
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Using the implicit function theorem on (34) we can deduce that
sign(n′(R)) = sign (R+ (R+ n (η − 1)) εv) (35)
with v˜(R) ≡ V˜ (y(R)) and εv ≡ v˜
′(R)R
v˜(R) < 0.
33 Expression (35) nicely confronts the two conflictive
effects with each other. We see that the elasticity η and εv are important determinants of the
curve n(R). I first discuss the impact of εv. If εv ≈ 0 e.g. because price competition is such
that equilibrium prices respond only weakly to a change of R then n′(R) > 0. In this case
less attention increases the revenue from the attention sets only weakly. At the same time
competition for the sets is increased which implies higher costs of attention. As the additional
costs outweigh the additional revenue gains profits decrease which leads to a smaller market. In
the absence of price competition (V (y, y,R) = v/R) we unambiguously get n′(R) > 0 (εv = 0
because in this case y′(R) = 0). In order for the revenue effect to dominate the cost effect if
consumer attention declines, the value of the attention set must respond sufficiently elastic to
R. If this is the case (e.g. because commodities are strong substitutes and hence economic
competition is intense, see section 5.2.3 below) then limited attention implies larger markets.
To explain the impact of η on n(R) note that a high value of η means that a change of f implies
a strong change of marginal costs which reduces the reagibility of f . In this sense η controls the
elasticity of attention competition: a high value of η means that f reacts less responsive to any
exogenous change. To see this use (33) to find
f =
(
n−R
n2θη
v˜(R)
) 1
η
=
(
τ
η
) 1
η
τ ≡ n−R
n2θ
v˜(R) (36)
Hence f ′(τ)τ/f(τ) = 1/η. A higher value of η means that the equilibrium f does not react
strongly to a change of R which also means that attention costs do not change much. Thus the
revenue effect is more likely to dominate the cost effect if η is large. Moreover, we can deduce
from (34) that n′(η) > 0 which by (33) means that equilibrium costs C(f) must decrease in η.
From (34) we see that
lim
η→∞ n(η) =
∆V˜ (y)
F
Similarly, if θ = 0 such that attention competition is free we get f∗ → ∞ and n = ∆V˜ (y)/F .
33The expression is negative because v˜′(R) = V˜ ′ (y(R)) y′(R) and y′(R) < 0 but V˜ ′(y(R)) > 0.
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In both cases equilibrium profits are only determined by the value of the attention set. As in
both cases C(f) = 0 this can be thought of an upper bound on the market size (for given R).
To summarise we note that if the economic competition is weak (εv ≈ 0), e.g. because of weak
substitutes, then firms cannot extract much additional revenue from a decline of attention and
the cost effect tends to dominate which implies smaller markets if consumers are less attentive.
If however the economic competition is strong or attention competition is inelastic (high η) then
less attentive consumers might imply higher profits and larger markets.
5.2.3 The comparative statics of the ACF-CES example
We can use the general results of section 5.2.2 to discuss the comparrative statics of the ACF-CES
example considered earlier. Suppose the parameter values are such that a free-entry equilibrium
with n > R occurs endogenously. From section 4.3 we know that a single symmetric SPE
exists in this example. As we use the ACF we immediately know from the previous section that
f ′(∆) > 0, f ′(R) < 0 and f(F ) is non-monotonic (hump-shaped). Also n′(∆) > 0 and n′(F ) < 0
follow directly from the last section. Because in the CES-example we have V (y, y,R) = y−cy
v
R
(see (31)) we can use (35) to examine n′(R) in the ACF-CES case. It is straightforward to show
that v˜(R) = vR1+σ(R−1) and εv =
(1−σ)
1+(R−1)σ ∈ (−1, 0). Hence for η = 1 we get sign(n′(R)) =
sign (R(1 + εv) and thus n
′(R) > 0. In this case less attentive consumers imply a very fierce
attention competition that involves high attention costs and leads to exit. However, if η is
large we could also get n′(R) < 0, i.e. the gains from consumer inattention more than cover
the increased attention costs. This leads to firm entry. Numerical evaluations of the ACF-CES
example confirm that, depending on the parameter constellation34, both cases may occur as
figure 7 suggests. Finally, it is clear that in the ACF-CES example consumer budget has the
same comparative statics as ∆, i.e. y′(v) = 0, f ′(v) > 0 and n′(v) > 0. A larger value of σ
means that commodities are stronger substitutes and hence the economic competition is more
intense. It can be shown that y′(σ) < 0, f ′(σ) < 0 and n′(σ) < 0 (see 8.6, part III).
34It can be shown that in the CES case we have ε′v(σ) < 0 which means that if the varieties are stronger
substitutes (larger σ) then, as suggested in the main text, n′(R) < 0 is more likely to occur.
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Figure 7: The ACF-CES example
6 Conclusion
To my knowledge, this is the first contribution that develops a rigorous game-theoretic setting
which allows to combine attention competition with economic competition.
In the model firms can influence their chance of perception which depends on the own attention
effort level but also on the effort level of all competitors and is endogenously determined.
In the free-entry equilibrium of the symmetric price-attention game prices, attention effort lev-
els and the number of active firms are endogenously determined. I derive general conditions
which assert that only one symmetric equilibrium exists and show that my main example of the
attention contest, the ACF, satisfies these properties.
Competition for attention emerges if and only if the information is superabundant relative to
perception capabilities, i.e. if the equilibrium number of information senders is higher than
the exogenous attention threshold. To the information senders the market as perceived by
consumers and not the effective market matters which is reflected in equilibrium prices: besides
reflecting e.g. traditional economic market power prices also reflect the scarcity of attention.
This important finding can explain e.g. why online prices have not dropped as much as expected
after the introduction of the Internet - a fact that search models and models of informative
advertising have significant difficulties to explain.
As firms can gain from inattentive consumers but at the same time need to cover the costs of
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getting attention there exist two conflictive effects that determine the market structure. If either
attention competition is inelastic or the economic competition is strong (commodities are strong
substitutes) then the positive revenue effect of limited attention dominates the costs of getting
attention which leads to higher profits and larger markets.
Specific models of price competition give more insight on the consequences of price-attention
competition. For example, it is possible to apply my setting to Salop’s model of circular prod-
uct differentiation - which also allows to examine the normative implications of price-attention
competition (see Hefti (2011a), chapter 4).
The model can be extended in several ways. One interesting case extends the basic model by
letting firms also choose the reach of their information campaign (as was sketched in section 2,
see Hefti (2011a), chapters 2 and 4). In the case of the Internet economy as considered in this
paper the reach was exogenously given to all active firms. In the more general case firms can
choose how many consumers (how many attention sets) to reach (e.g. in how many newspapers
to advertise) versus their probability to get a consumers’ attention (e.g. where to place an ad in
a given newspaper). All main results of this paper also hold in this extended setting. Moreover,
the pro-competitive effect of informative advertising vanishes under limited attention and policy
implications taken from models of informative advertising that ignore limited attention might
have adverse effects if limited attention matters.
A different extension is to relax the assumption that the attention distribution is independent
of the price distribution. This would certainly be the case with low-price filters. Nevertheless,
my model still can be used to address such problems simply by letting the attention probability
vector be determined by relative prices. The implications of such pricing filters, especially in
the context of quality goods, is the subject of current research.
7 Appendix A: On uniqueness and stability
In section 4 I have presented the assumptions on the value function V and the probability
function p which exclude the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria in the symmetric price-
attention game. I have shown that the ACF satisfies all assumptions on p.
In this section I ask the more ambitious question whether there can be asymmetric equilibria
in the symmetric game. Intuitively, the interaction of economic competition with attention
competition suggests reasons why we could expect asymmetric ”specialisation” equilibria to
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exist. We can imagine some firms to specialise in the economic competition. These firms set a
low price and do not advertise a lot (i.e. choose a low attention effort level). The other firms
specialise in attention competition: they choose a high price and high attention levels. A firm
in the first group knows that its chance of perception is smaller than the chance of an attention
specialist but i) it needs less revenue to cover attention costs and ii) it may earn more revenue
than an attention specialist from those attention sets both are in. The firms in the second group
are in more attention sets which could cover their higher attention expenditure.
I now derive the conditions that exclude the possibility of asymmetric equilibria in the price-
attention game. To achieve this goal we cannot work with the symmetric opponent form of the
profit function. But because of the complex nature of the price-attention game (every profit
function has his own ”context” Bj , see (5)) it is clear that standard approaches to uniqueness
such as the univalence approach or the index theorem are not feasible because we would have to
evaluate at (2N)× (2N)-matrix! Fortunately, there exists an approach to uniqueness that sepa-
rates between the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria and the possibility of asymmetric
equilibria. This approach is developed in Hefti (2011b). The proof of the inexistence of asym-
metric equilibria in the symmetric price-attention game in this section is an application of this
methodology. Further, I briefly discuss stability of the symmetric equilibrium under iterative
adjustments.
The proof is organized as follows. First, I consider a reduced version of the game where the
attention distribution is given exogenously but prices are chosen simultaneously. I show that,
under certain assumption, there only is one equilibrium in this pricing game, the symmetric
equilibrium, where all firms choose the same price y independent of the attention distribution.
Then it suffices to find conditions that assert that the pure attention game for given and identical
prices y only has one equilibrium, the symmetric equilibrium.
7.1 Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
First, I state the basic assumptions regarding price competition that are maintained throughout
appendix A. Let Sy ≡ [c, ymax] as before. Suppose that the attention distribution P as defined
by (2) is exogenously fixed with the property that PA > 0 for all A ∈ A. A firm can only choose
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its price yj . I consider the following profit function:
Π(yj) =
∑
A∈Bj
PAV
j(A)∆ (37)
Suppose that all n firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their price according to
(37). Then
(
n, Sny ,Π
)
is an n-player pricing game. I impose the following assumptions on the
value functions V j(YA) with A ∈ Bj :
Assumption 7 Let A ∈ Bj ⊂ A and |A| = z > 1. Then
a) For all A ∈ Bj and j = 1, ..., n: V j(YA) = V σ(j)(Yσ(A)), where σ is a permutation of A.
V j(YA) > 0 if yj = yg = y ∈ Int(Sy) for all g ∈ A.
b) V j(YA) ∈ C2
(
Int(Szy),R
)
, V j(YA) is strongly quasiconcave in y and
∂V j(YA)
∂yg
> 0 for
g ∈ A.
c) ∂V
j(YA)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=c
> 0 and ∂V
j(YA)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=ymax
< 0.
d) For yg ∈ (c, ymax) with g 6= j:
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= 0 ⇒
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y1yg
> 0
The last assumption means that prices are strategic complements. In case of an equal distribu-
tion of attention, i.e. P (A) = P (A′) =
 n
R
−1 for all A,A′ ∈ A, the symmetric opponents
form of (37) is
Π(y) =
 RnV (y, y¯, R)∆ R < nV (y, y¯, n)∆ R ≥ n (38)
To see this in the case where R < n note that |Bj | =
 n− 1
R− 1
. Then if yg = y¯ for any g 6= j
we have ∑
A∈Bj
PAV
j(YA)∆ =
1 n
R

 n− 1
R− 1
V (y, y¯, R)∆ = R
n
V (y, y¯, R)∆
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Lemma 5 Let P (A) = P (A′) for all A,A′ ∈ A and take assumption 7 as well as condition (18)
to be satisfied. Then the interior symmetric equilibrium y∗ ∈ (c, ymax) is the unique equilibrium
of the pricing game.
Proof: Appendix B (8.12)
Note that because ∂∂y (V1(y, y, z)) = V11(y, y, z)+V12(y, y, z) the inequality in condition (18) can
be rewritten as −V11(y, y, z) > V12(y, y, z). If even
V1(y
∗, y∗, z) = 0 ⇒ −V11(y∗, y∗, z) > |V12(y∗, y∗, z)| (39)
holds then the symmetric equilibrium y∗ is locally contraction-stable (stable under iterative
adjustments; see Hefti (2011b)).
Lemma 5 implies that if R ≥ n the general proof of uniqueness in the symmetric price-attention
game is already finished because there cannot be an equilibrium other than (y∗, f) with f = 0
and y∗ defined by V1(y∗, y∗, n) = 0.
From now on I always set n > R. Suppose that the attention distribution function P is still
exogenously given but PA > 0 may be different for different A ∈ A. An interior equilibrium
(y1, ..., yn) of the pricing game satisfies
∑
A∈B1
PA
∂V 1(YA)
∂y1
...∑
A∈Bn
PA
∂V n(YA)
∂yn
 ≡ Dy (y1, ..., yn) = 0 (40)
The following proposition shows that under a further assumption the only interior equilibrium
price vector is symmetric and independent of the attention distribution.
Proposition 6 Suppose that n > R and PA > 0 for all A ∈ A. Then under assumption 7
and condition (18) there exists a single symmetric equilibrium y∗ that is independent of the
distribution of PA. Further, if for any feasible yg with g 6= j and any A′ ∈ Bj with j, g ∈ A′
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= 0⇒ −∂
2V j (YA′)
∂y2j
> (R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j (YA′)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ (41)
holds then y∗ is the unique equilibrium of the pricing game.
45
Proof: Appendix B (8.13)
Note that if the inequality in condition (41) holds even without the requirement that
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
=
0 then uniqueness follows directly from the contraction mapping theorem (see Vives (1999), p.
47).35
Now I return to the symmetric price-attention game from the main text.
Proposition 7 (Sufficient conditions for uniqueness) Suppose n > R and assumptions 4
and 7 as well as (41) and (19) are satisfied. If for all A ∈ Bj, f1, ..., fn ∈ (0,∞) and any fixed
player g 6= j the condition
−∂
2PA(F)
∂f2j
+
∂2PA(F)
∂fj∂fg
> 0 (42)
holds then the symmetric equilibrium (y, f) determined by (16) is the unique equilibrium of the
symmetric price-attention game.
Proof: Appendix B (8.14)
Note that if all presuppositions of proposition 7 are satisfied for any n ≥ 2 and (27) and (28)
hold then there only is one equilibrium (y, f, n) in the free-entry game and the equilibrium is
symmetric.
From the main text we already know that the ACF does not generate multiple symmetric
equilibria. But does the ACF also satisfy (42)?
Consider (14) and suppose firm j did not get the first draw. Then one of firm j’s competitors
must have succeeded in doing so. The aggregate mass of the balls remaining in the urn has
changed conditional on the ball drawn out. Suppose for example that the ball of firm g 6= j
has been drawn. Then conditional on this event firm j’s chance of getting the next draw is
fj
n∑
k=1
fk−fg
. We can use such a line of reasoning to calculate the probabilities PA for all A ∈ A.
To illustrate this, suppose R = 2 and n = 3. Then A = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}. Let A = {1, 2}.
Then PA(F) = PA(f1, f2, f3) and
PA(f1, f2, f3) =
f1f2
f1 + f2 + f3
(
1
f2 + f3
+
1
f1 + f3
)
35In the CES example it can be shown by applying proposition (2) for e.g. σ = 2, R = 2 and n = 3 that in this
case the joint best-response function is not a global contraction but condition (41) holds resulting in a unique
price-equilibrium.
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Corollary 3 Let R = 2. The ACF satisfies condition(42).
Proof: Appendix B (8.15)
Remark: The procedure of the proof of 3 can be applied to show that (42) is satisfied also if
R = 3. I conjecture that (42) holds for any R > 2 under the ACF.
7.2 An example
I now provide an example of a function V j that satisfies assumption 7 and condition (41). Let
j denote the representative firm. Then for any A ∈ Bj let
V j(YA) = (yj − c)xj(YA)
with
xj(YA) = max
0, 11 + (z − 1)γ
1− 1 + (z − 2)γ
1− γ yj +
γ
1− γ
∑
i∈A:i 6=j
yi
 (43)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) controls the degree of substitutability36 between perceived commodities and
z = min {R,n}. This demand function is often used in oligopolistic theory and IO models
and can be microfounded by assuming a quasilinear upper tier utility function and quadratic
subutility (see e.g. Vives (1999) p. 145-146). For simplicity, I set c = 0 and ∆ = 1.
Theorem 1 Suppose Sy = [0, 1]. Then with (43) the symmetric equilibrium y
∗ ∈ (0, 1) of the
pricing game is unique and independent of the attention distribution.
Proof:
In step 1 I show that assumption 7 is satisfied. In step 2 I show that (41) is satisfied.
Step 1: Assume j ∈ A ∈ Bj .
a) Permutation-invariance is obvious. Let yj = yg = y ∈ (0, 1) for all g ∈ A. Then V j(YA) =
(1−y)y
1+(z−1)γ > 0.
b) We have ∂
2V j(YA)
∂y2j
= −2 1+(z−2)γ(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) < 0 because z > 1 and γ < 1. Hence V j(YA) is
strongly concave and thus also strongly quasiconcave.
36γ → 1 means that commodities are perfect substitutes whereas γ → 0 means that commodities are indepen-
dent.
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c) We have
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣∣
y=0
=
1 + γ1−γ
∑
i∈A:i 6=j
yi
1 + (z − 1)γ > 0
and
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣∣
y=1
= −
1 + (2z − 3)γ − γ ∑
i∈A:i 6=j
yi
(1− γ) (1 + (z − 1)γ)
Thus ∂V
j(YA)
∂yj
∣∣∣
y=1
< 0 because 1 + γ(z − 2) > 0.
d) Because ∂
2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
= γ(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) > 0 for any g 6= j with g ∈ A the game is strictly
supermodular in prices. Hence prices are strategic complements.
Step 2:
Assume g ∈ A. Then
−∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
> (z − 1)
∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg ∣∣∣ ⇔ 2 1+(z−2)γ(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ) > γ(z−1)(1−γ)(1+(z−1)γ)
⇔ 2 + γ (z − 3) > 0
which holds as z > 1 and γ < 1. Hence condition (41) from proposition 6 holds and so does
condition (18). This implies the existence of a unique interior equilibrium for any n,R > 1 that
is independent of the attention distribution. Moreover, the equilibrium is symmetric.

If R = 2 we know from corollary 4 that if we use the ACF to determine the attention probability
distribution the price-attention game only has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
7.3 Stability
This section provides conditions which imply that the symmetric equilibrium is a local contrac-
tion.
Proposition 8 The symmetric equilibrium (y, f) of the price-attention game is locally contraction-
stable if V (y, y¯, R) is a local contraction at y (condition (39) holds) and for n > R
∆
p1(f, f, n,R)V2(y, y,R) + |p12(f, f, n,R)|V (y, y,R)
− (p11(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′′(f)) < 1 (44)
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Proof: See Hefti (2011b).

Corollary 4 Suppose n > R and V2(y, y,R) = 0 and let C(f) = θf
η where η ≥ 2 and
p(f, f¯ , n,R) is given by the ACF. Then the symmetric equilibrium is locally contraction-stable.
Proof: Appendix B (8.16)
Note that e.g. with η = 1 the contraction condition (44) need not hold generally for the ACF.
In any case we require V2(y, y,R) to be small. Intuitively, the contraction condition rather holds
with higher η as then attention competition is less elastic (see (36)) and hence firms only respond
weakly to small deviations around the symmetric equilibrium.
8 Appendix B
8.1 Properties of the ACF
Lemma 6 There exists a continuously differentiable extension to (13) which is given by
pC(f, f, n,R) = 1− Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n−R
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n
) (45)
where Γ(x) denotes the Gammafunction evaluated at x and R and n are real numbers with
R < n.
pC1 (f, f, n,R) =
n−R
nf
(ψ (1 + n)− ψ (1 + n−R)) (46)
where ψ(.) is the digamma function. If R0 is an integer then
pC1 (f, f, n,R0) =
n−R0
nf
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
and pC1 (f, f, n,R0) is strictly concave in R around R0.
Proof:
First note that
R∏
i=1
(
(n− i)f¯) = f¯R (n− 1)!
(n−R)! (n−R) (47)
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The Gamma-function Γ(x), which is continuously differentiable on x ∈ R+, has the properties
that n! = Γ(n+ 1) if n is a positive integers and Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x). Hence (47) becomes
f¯R
Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Equivalently,
R∏
i=1
(
f + (n− i)f¯) = f¯R R∏
i=1
(
f
f¯
+ n− i
)
= f¯R
Γ
(
f
f¯
+n
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+n−R
)
(48)
Hence
pC(f, f, n,R) = 1− Γ(n)
Γ(n−R)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n−R
)
Γ
(
f
f¯
+ n
)
which is continous for R < n and P (f)
R→n−−→ 1 as Γ(n− R) R→n−−→ ∞. As the derivation makes
clear we have p(f, f¯ , n,R) = pC(f, f¯ , n,R) whenever R and n are integers. Differentiation of
(45) at f = f¯ > 0 then yields (46). If R0 is an integer we have
ψ (1 + n) = ψ (1 + n−R0) +
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
as also the digamma function is recursive with ψ(1 + x) = ψ(x) + 1x . Hence
pC1 (f, f, n,R0) =
n−R0
nf
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
which corresponds to (20). But know is is formally possible to take the derivative and
pC14(f, f, n,R0) =
1
nf
(
(n−R0) 1
(1 + n−R0)2
−
∑ 1
1 + n− i
)
But
pC14(f, f, n,R0)−
pC1 (f, f, n,R0)
R0
=
n−R0
(1 + n−R0)2
− n
R0
R0∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
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which is negative as n−R0
(1+n−R0)2 < 1 but
R0∑
i=1
1
1+n−i =
1
n +
1
n−1 + ...+
1
1+n−R0 >
1
n +
1
n + ...+
1
n =
R0
n .
Hence pC1 (f, f, n,R0) is strictly concave in R around R0.
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Lemma 7 With the ACF based on (20) the following properties hold:
a) p1(f,f,n,R)n + p13(f, f, n,R) > 0
b) p
′′(f,f,n,R)
p1(f,f,n,R)
< p13(f, f, n,R)
n2
R
c) p
′′(f,f,n,R)
p1(f,f,n,R)
< − nRp1(f, f, n,R)
d) p1(f, f, n,R) for given f > 0 is a hump-shaped function of n.
where p′′(f, f, n,R) ≡ ∂p1(f,f,n,R)∂f .
Proof:
a) As
p13(f, f, n,R) =
1
nf
(
R
n
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2)
(49)
we have
p1
n
+ p13 > 0 ⇔
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
> 0 (50)
which holds because
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i − (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
=
R∑
i=1
(
1 +R− i
(1 + n− i)2
)
> 0
b) From (20) we see that p
′′
p1
= − 1f . Then using (49) gives
p′′
p1
< p13
n2
R
⇔ − R
n2
<
R
n2
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i −
(n−R)
n
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
Reformulation gives
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
− (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
> 0
37It is an easy numerical excersise to show that this result generalises for an arbitrary real-valued R0.
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or equivalently
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
− (n−R)
R∑
i=1
(
1
1 + n− i
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i −
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
But then because of (50) we only need to show
R
n
(
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i + 1
)
−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
or
R−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (n−R) > 0 (51)
which is true because
R−
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i (n−R) =
R∑
i=1
(
1− n−R
1 + n− i
)
=
R∑
i=1
(
1 +R− i
1 + n− i
)
> 0
c) Because p
′′
p1
= − 1f we have
p′′
p1
< − n
R
p1 ⇔ 1 > n−R
R
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
or equivalently
R− (n−R)
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i > 0
which holds because of (51).
d) Let n > R and use (49) to find
sign (p13(f, f, n,R)) = sign
(
R∑
i=1
(
2R− n+ Rn (1− i)
))
= sign
(2R− n) + Rn − R(R+ 1)2n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψ(n)

But n > R implies that ψ′(n) = −1− R
n2
+ R(R+1)
2n2
< 0. Moreover, we have ψ(R) = R+12 > 0
and ψ(2R) = 12 − (R+1)4 < 0 because R > 1. These findings imply that p1(f, f, n,R) must
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be hump-shaped in n.
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8.2 Proof of proposition 1
Use (3) to find
∑
j∈I
pij =
∑
j∈I
( ∑
A∈A
PiA 1 [j ∈ A]
)
=
∑
A∈A
PiA
∑
j∈I
1 [j ∈ A]
=
∑
j∈I
1 [j ∈ A] = z

8.3 Proof of lemma 1
The first part follows directly from (3). If R ≥ n then pj = 1 for any active firm because there
only is one attention set, namely I itself, which is perceived with probability one. Now suppose
n > R. Then (3) implies pj =
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) which gives pj = pj(fj , f−j). Now suppose that
pj < 1. Then
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) < 1 which by assumption 1 implies that PA(F) increases in fj for all
A ∈ Bj . But this implies that pj(fj , f−j) increases in fj .

8.4 Proof of lemma 2
Suppose n > R. Because fg = f¯ for any g 6= j we have PA(F) = PA′(F) for A,A′ ∈ Bj . Let
s ≡ |Bj | and suppose j ∈ A. Then
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F) = sPA(F) for A ∈ Bj . Lemma 1 and (3) imply
that sPA(F) = p(f, f¯ , n,R). Hence
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)V j(YA)∆ = V (y, y¯, R)∆
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)
= p(f, f¯ , n,R)V (y, y¯, R)∆
If this is used in (5) we get (9). If R ≥ n then pj = 1 and V j(YA) = V (y, y¯, n) which then
implies (10).

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Remark: Hence if we know p(f, f¯ , n,R) then we also know PA(F) for any A ∈ Bj . But then
we also can find PA′(F) for any A′ /∈ Bj . To see this let B−j ≡ {A′ ∈ A : j /∈ A′}. Then we have
PA′(F) = PA′′(F) for any A′, A′′ ∈ B−j . Then
∑
A′∈B−j
PA′(F) = 1−
∑
A∈Bj
PA(F)
= 1− sPA(F) = 1− p(f, f¯ , n,R)
8.5 Proof of proposition 2
Let n > R. Define
G(f) ≡
R∏
i=1
g(f, i) (52)
with
g(f, i) ≡ (n− i)f¯
f + (n− i)f¯
a) Obviously G(f) ∈ [0, 1] for f, f¯ > 0. Hence p ∈ [0, 1]. b) Relativity is obvious. c) With
−∂G(f)
∂f
= −G(f)
R∑
i=1
∂g(f, i)
∂f
1
g(f, i)
and
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i) = − (n−i)f¯(f+(n−i)f¯)2
f+(n−i)f¯
(n−i)f¯
= − 1
f+(n−i)f¯
we get
p1(f, f¯ , n,R) = −∂G(f)
∂f
= G(f)
R∑
i=1
1
f + (n− i)f¯ > 0 (53)
The same reasoning gives
p2(f, f¯ , n,R) = −G(f)
R∑
i=1
∂g(f, i)
∂f¯
1
g(f, i)
But as
∂g(f, i)
∂f¯
=
f(n− i)(
f + f¯(n− i))2 > 0
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we have p2(f, f¯ , n,R) < 0. Similarly, p3(f, f¯ , n,R) < 0 as
∂g(f, i)
∂n
=
ff¯(
f + f¯(n− i))2 > 0
Suppose n ≥ R+ 1. The (strong) monotonicity of p in R can be seen from
G(f,R+ 1)−G(f,R) = −G(f,R)
(
f
f + f¯ (n− (R+ 1))
)
< 0
Finally, I show that p11(f, f¯ , n,R) < 0.
p11(f, f¯ , n,R) = −∂
2G(f)
∂f2
= −
(
∂G(f)
∂f
R∑
i=1
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i) +G(f)
R∑
i=1
(
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
g(f, i)−
(
∂g(f,i)
∂f
)2)
1
g(f,i)2
)
= −G(f)
([(
R∑
i=1
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
)2
−
R∑
i=1
(
∂g(f,i)
∂f
1
g(f,i)
)2]
+
R∑
i=1
(
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
g(f, i)
)
1
g(f,i)2
)
(54)
But as
(
R∑
i=1
ai
)2
>
R∑
i=1
a2i for ai > 0 and
∂2g(f,i)
∂f2
> 0 the result follows immediately.
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8.6 The ACF-CES example: calculations
Part I:
In case of (11) V1(y, y¯, R) = 0 implies
yσ(R− 1)(σ − 1) = c (y¯σ−1 + yσ−1(R− 1)σ) (55)
which is equivalent to
yσ−1(R− 1) (y(σ − 1)− cσ) = cy¯σ−1
which for y¯ ≥ c implies that y > cσσ−1 and hence also y > c. Applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to (55) an rearranging gives
y′(y¯) = c
(yy¯)2−σ
σ(R− 1)(y − c) > 0
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and
y′(R) = y
y(1− σ) + cσ
(R− 1)(σ − 1)σ(y − c) < 0
Part II:
Suppose that n > R. Use y¯ = y in (55). This gives (29). Moreover,
V (y, y,R) = (y − c) v
yR
=
v
1 + (R− 1)σ (56)
Using this in (22) gives (30).
Part III:
y′(R) follows directly from (29). From proposition 9 (see 8.11) we can deduce sign(f ′(σ)) =
sign
(
V1σ(p13 +
p1
n
)
and thus with the ACF f ′(σ) < 0 follows because of V1σ = − (y−c)v(R−1)R2y2 < 0.
Similarly, we get sign(n′(σ)) = sign
(−V1σ (np21 +Rp′′ − ω)) and because of the ACF we have
n′(σ) < 0.
8.7 Proof of proposition 3
Because the function V (y, y¯, z) is twice continuously differentiable in y, y¯, the function V1(y, y, z)
must be continuous in y ∈ (c, ymax) for any z > 1. Because of the boundary condition a) i) in
assumption 5 the equation V1(y, y, z) = 0 must then have a solution y = y(z) for any z > 1
and y ∈ (c, ymax). Moreover, because of (18) the solution to V1(y, y, z) = 0 must be unique for
any given z > 1 (this is an index theorem result; see Hefti (2011b)). Hence if R ≥ n then there
exists exactly one symmetric equilibrium (y, f) with f = 0 and y = y(n) ∈ (c, ymax).
If n > R repeating the previous argument shows that there exists a unique solution y = y(R) ∈
(c, ymax) to V1(y, y,R) = 0. Because p1(f, f, n,R) is continuous for f ∈ (0,∞) (a consequence of
assumption 4) and because of the boundary conditions a) ii) in assumption 5, V (y, y, z) ∈ (0,∞)
and (7) the equation
ψ(f) ≡ p1(f, f, n,R)V (y, y,R)∆− C ′(f) = 0
must have a solution f = f(n,R,∆) ∈ (0,∞). Condition (19) together with (7) implies that
ψ(f) is strictly decreasing in f ∈ (0,∞) which means that the solution must be unique.
Consequently, there exists a unique vector (y, f) that solves (17).
(Second-order conditions) If R ≥ n then V11(y, y, n) < 0 implies that second-order conditions of
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the representative firm’s maximisation problem in (10) are satisfied at y = y(n). Similarly, if
n > R then the second-order conditions of (9) evaluated at y = y(R) and f = f(n,R,∆) are
satisfied because Π11 =
R
nV11(y, y,R)∆ < 0, Π22 = p11(f, f, n,R)V (y, y,R)∆ − C ′′(f) < 0 and
Π12 = p1(f, f, n,R)V1(y, y,R)∆ = 0.
Thus the existence of exactly one symmetric equilibrium has been proved.

8.8 Proof of lemma 4
Let n > R. If we set f = f¯ > 0 then (52) gives G(f) = n−Rn . Using this in (53) gives (20).
Moreover, (20) shows that the ACF satisfies assumption 5. Note that
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i =
R−1∑
j=0
1
n− j = H(n)−H(n−R) (57)
whereH(x) is the x-th harmonic number. It is well known that the sequence (H(x)− Ln(x))x∈N+
is monotonically decreasing and converges to the Euler-Mascheroni constant γ. Hence
H(n)− Ln(n) = γ + e(n)
where e(n) is an error term with dedn < 0. Thus the maximal error occurs at n = 1 and has
e(1) = 1 − γ < 1/2. Because of the subtraction in (57) the constant γ cancels out. Further
e(n−R) is large if R is close to n. Thus the overall numerical error in setting H(x) = Ln(x) +γ
in (57), e = e(n) − e(n − R) is bounded in absolute value by one and is small if n large and R
small. Thus
R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
∼= Ln(n)− Ln(n−R) = Ln
(
n
n−R
)
By defining x ≡ R/n we have
Ln
(
n
n−R
)
= Ln
(
1
1− x
)
Applying a first-order Taylor expansion at x0 = 0 then gives
Ln
(
1
1− x
)
= x+ r1 (0, x)
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with |r1 (0, x)| ≤ x21−x . Thus again if R is relatively small compared to n we can expect our
approximation to perform numerically well. Thus the suggested approximation (21) is nummer-
ically accurate whenever R/n is small.

8.9 Proof of proposition 4
Existence:
From (23) we see that profits are continuous in (y, f, n), because assumption 6 implies that
V (y, y, z) with z = min {R,n} is continuous in n. Further we have Π(yˆ, 0, 2) ≥ 0 by pre-
supposition. n → ∞ implies n > R. Hence lim
n→∞ Π(y, f, n) = −F − C(f) < 0. From
proposition 3 we know that for any given n ≥ 2 a solution (y, f) to (24) - (25) exists. More-
over, because of lemma 8 (see below) (y, f) = (y(n), f(n)) is a continuous function of n. Hence
Π(y(n), f(n), n) is a continuous function of n and consequently there must exist n′ ∈ [2,∞) such
that Π(y(n′), f(n′), n′) = 0 which proves existence.
Uniqueness:
Suppose n ≥> 2 is given exogenously. Let (y(n), f(n)) denote the solution to (17). Because
of proposition 3 and lemma 8 we now that (y(n), f(n)) is unique for any given n and that
the vector (y(n), f(n)) is a continuously differentiable function of n if n 6= R. Define Π˜(n) ≡
Π (y(n), f(n), n) where the function Π is given by (23). Then Π˜(n) is a continuously differentiable
function of n if n 6= R. But by the definition of Π˜ the vector (y(n′), f(n′), n′) is a symmetric
equilibrium of the free entry game if and only if we have Π˜(n′) = 0. If we have Π˜′(n) < 0 for
all n 6= R that satisfy Π˜(n) = 0 (∗) then there can be at most one n ≥ 2 that solves Π˜(n) = 0.
I now show that (28) is a sufficient condition for (∗).
Let n < R. Then
Π˜′(n) = ∆
−V2(y, y, n)V13(y, y, n)∂∂y (V1(y, y, n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+V3(y, y, n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0
where Π˜′(n) is evaluated at Π˜(n) = 0. Consequently, condition (∗) holds if n < R.
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Now let n > R. Then
Π˜′(n) = − R
n2
− p1(f, f, n,R)f ′(n)
where Π˜′(n) is evaluated at Π˜(n) = 0. But (see 8.10)
f ′(n) = − p13(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)
∂
∂f (p1(f, f, n,R)) ∆V (y, y,R)− C ′′(f)
This implies
Π˜′(n) = − R
n2
+ p1
p13∆V
∂
∂f (p1) ∆V − C ′′
Then we have Π˜′(n) < 0 if
p13
n2
R
>
∂
∂f (p1)
p1
− C
′′
∆V p1
(58)
Because C
′′
∆V p1
≥ 0 condition (28) is a sufficient condition for (58). Consequently, condition (∗)
also holds if n > R.
Thus there only is one vector (y, f, n) that solves (24)-(26). Hence there only is one symmetric
equilibrium.

Lemma 8 Let R,n > 1. Suppose assumptions 5 and 6 are satisfied. Then the equilibrium
vector (y, f) defined by (17) is a continuous function of n and continuously differentiable in n
except at n = R.
Proof: Because of proposition 3 ∃!(y, f) that solves (17).
Case 1: n < R. Then f = 0 and hence f ′(n) = 0. Because of (18) the IFT tells us that y(n) is
continuously differentiable in n. Consequently, (y, f) is continuously differentiable in n.
Case 2: n > R. Let J˜ denote the Jacobian of (16) with respect to (y, f):
J˜ =
 ∂∂y (V1(y, y,R)) 0
p1(f, f, n,R)∆
∂
∂y (V (y, y,R))
∂
∂f (p1(f, f, n,R)) ∆V (y, y,R)− C ′′(f)

But then
Det(J˜) =
∂
∂y
(V1(y, y,R))
(
∂
∂f
(p1(f, f, n,R)) ∆V (y, y,R)− C ′′(f)
)
> 0
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which by the IFT means that (y, f) is continuously differentiable in n.
Case 3: n = R. Because
y =
 y(R) R < ny(n) R ≥ n
y is continuous in n but not differentiable at n = R. I now show that f is continuous in n also
at n = R. We have
f =
 f(n,R,∆) R < n0 R ≥ n
Let
ψ(f) = p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′(f)
Then the Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition corresponding to the representative firm’s opimiza-
tion problem with respect to f is
ψ(f) + λ = 0 λf = 0 f, λ ≥ 0
Suppose f > 0. Then
lim
n→R+
ψ(f) = −C ′(f) + λ
But then f > 0 implies C ′(f) > 0 which implies λ > 0, a contradiction to optimality. Conse-
quently, we must have lim
n→R+
f(n,R,∆) = 0. Hence f is continuous at n = R.

8.10 Proof of proposition 5
The Jacobian J of (16) is given by
J =
 V ′′ 0
p1∆V2 p
′′∆V − C ′′

where V ′′ ≡ ∂∂y (V1(y, y,R)) and p′′ ≡ ∂∂f (p1(f, f, n,R)). Hence Det(J) = V ′′ (p′′∆V − C ′′) > 0.
Let ψ ≡ p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′(f, α). Then by Cramer’s rule we have
sign(y′(χ)) = sign
(−V1χ
V ′′
)
= sign (V1χ)
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and
sign(f ′(χ)) = sign
(
p1∆V2V1χ − ψχV ′′
Det(J)
)
= sign
(
p1∆V2V1χ − ψχV ′′
)
where χ ∈ {R,n,∆, F, α}. Then it is easy to see that y′(R) < 0, f ′(∆) > 0 and f ′(α) < 0. If
χ = R we get
sign(f ′(R)) = sign(p1V2V13︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− V ′′︸︷︷︸
<0
(p14V + p1V3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
)
If χ = n we get sign(f ′(n)) = sign(p13). Hence the sign of f ′(R) and f ′(n) can only be
determined under further assumptions.

8.11 Comparative statics under free entry: calculations
Assume parameter values such that an attention equilibrium (n > R) occurs endogenously. The
Jacobian of (24) - (26) with respect to (y, f, n) is
J =

V ′′ 0 0
p1∆V2 p
′′∆V − C ′′ p13∆V
R
n∆V2 −p1∆V − Rn2 ∆V
 (59)
Then after some manipulation
sign (Det(J)) = sign
(
p′′
p1
− p13n
2
R
)
But then (28) implies that Det(J) < 0. Let χ ∈ {R,∆, F, α}.
Proposition 9 Suppose an attention equilibrium (n > R) occurs endogenously. Then the com-
parative statics are given by
y′(χ) = V1χ∆
2V 2
Det(J)
(
R
n2
p′′ − p1p13 − ωn2
)
f ′(χ) = ∆VDet(J)
(
V ′′
(
RΠfχ
n2
+ Πχp13
)
− V1χ∆RV2n
(
p13 +
p1
n
))
n′(χ) = ∆VDet(J)
(
V1χ∆V2
n
(
np21 +Rp
′′ − ω)− V ′′R (Rp′′Πχ + p1RΠfχ −Πχω))
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where Πχ ≡ ∂∂χ
(
R
nV (y, y,R)− F − C(f, α)
)
, Πfχ ≡ ∂∂χ (p1(f, f, n,R)∆V (y, y,R)− C ′(f, α)),
ω ≡ C′′(f,α)R∆V ≥ 0 and J is the Jacobian (59) with Det(J) < 0.
Proof:
Follows immediately by applying Cramer’s rule to
J

y′(χ)
f ′(χ)
n′(χ)
 = −

V1χ
Πfχ
Πχ


8.12 Proof of lemma 5
First note that under assumption 7 and by the definition of V (y, y¯, z) (see 3.3.1) we have a
symmetric differentiable game that permits only interior equilibria and asserts the existence of
a symmetric equilibrium. Any symmetric equilibrium must satisfy V1(y
∗, y∗, z) = 0 with y ∈
Int(Sy). Strategic complementarity excludes asymmetric equilibria. Condition (18) corresponds
to the condition that rules out multiple symmetric equilibria (see Hefti (2011b)).

8.13 Proof of proposition 6
Let y1 = ... = yn = y. Then by the symmetry of V
j we have
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
=
∂V j(YA′)
∂yj
= V1(y, y,R)
for all A,A′ ∈ Bj . Hence
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂V j(YA)
∂yj
= V1(y, y,R)
∑
A∈Bj
PA
But lemma 5 implies the existence of a unique y∗ with V1(y∗, y∗, R) = 0. The inexistence
of multiple symmetric equilibria for any non-degenerate distribution of PA follows from (40).
Assumption 7 implies that no boundary equilibria exist. To proof the claim of uniqueness I
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apply the index theorem (see Vives (1999), p. 48), which requires the Jacobian of −Dy to have
a positive determinant whenever Dy = 0 holds. The j-th row of this Jacobian is(
− ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂y1
· · · − ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
· · · − ∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yn
)
I now show that (41) implies
−
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
>
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (60)
The triangle inequality implies
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
g 6=j
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ ≥∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Symmetry of V j(·) implies for any A ∈ Bj that ∃g(A) 6= j ∈ A such that
∑
g 6=j
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (R− 1) ∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣
Hence a sufficient condition for (60) to hold is
−
∑
A∈Bj
PA
∂2V j(YA)
∂y2j
>
∑
A∈Bj
PA(R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣
which is equivalent to
∑
A∈Bj
PA
(
−∂
2V j(YA)
∂y2j
− (R− 1)
∣∣∣∣∂2V j(YA)∂yj∂yg(A)
∣∣∣∣
)
> 0 (61)
But (61) is obviously implied by condition (41). Symmetry further implies that whenever (60)
holds then a similar statement holds for any other row of the n×n - Jacobian of −Dy. But then
−Dy must have a dominant diagonal whenever Dy = 0 and hence −Dy must have a positive
determinant38 if Dy = 0. But then by the index theorem we conclude that the symmetric
equilibrium must be unique.
38This follows because Det(−Dy) = r1 · ... · rn and all eigenvalues rk must have positive real parts.
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8.14 Proof of proposition 7
Because (41) is required to hold the attention distribution does not affect the equilibrium price
by proposition 6. The equilibrium price is determined vy V1(y, y,R) = 0. Thus we only need
to show that for the equilibrium price y the attention competition does not generate any asym-
metric equilibria. Because Πfjfj =
∑
A∈Bj
∂PA(F)
∂f2j
V (YA) − C ′′(fj) and Πfjfg =
∑
A∈Bj
∂PA(F)
∂fjfg
V (YA)
condition (42) implies that −Πfjfj + Πfjfg > 0. But this means that the slope of player j’s best
resonse function with respect to fg must be larger than −1:
∂fj(f1, ..., fn)
∂fg
= −Πfjfg
Πfjfj
> −1
But then there cannot be any asymmetric attention equilibria (see Hefti (2011b)). Condition
(19) rules out the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria. Consequently, there can only be
one equilibrium in the price-attention game, the symmetric equilibrium.

8.15 Proof of corollary 3
For simplicity I set j = 1 and g = 2. The following argument obviously remains the same if any
different players were used.
I use the following decomposition of B1. Let Bˆ2 ≡ {A ∈ B1 : 1 ∈ A ∧ 2 ∈ A} and Bˆ−2 ≡
{A ∈ B1 : 1 ∈ A ∧ 2 /∈ A}. Hence
Π1 =
∑
A∈Bˆ1
PAV (YA) +
∑
A∈Bˆ2
PAV (YA)− C(f1)− F
Thus according to proposition 7 we need to proof
−∂
2PA
∂f21
+
∂2PA
∂f1∂f2
> 0 (62)
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for f1, ..., fn ∈ (0,∞) and any A ∈ B1. Suppose A ∈ Bˆ−2. Then PA takes on the form
PA =
f1fh∑
fj
(
1∑
fj − f1 +
1∑
fj − fh
)
where 3 ≤ h ≤ n. Now suppose A′ ∈ Bˆ2. Then
PA′ =
f1f2∑
fj
(
1∑
fj − f1 +
1∑
fj − f2
)
In fact with R = 2 there can only be one such set: A′ = {1, 2}. Differentiation yields:
− ∂
2
∂f21
PA +
∂2
∂f1∂f2
PA =
1
(
∑
fj − fh)2
− 1
(
∑
fj)
2 > 0
and
− ∂
2
∂f21
PA′ +
∂2
∂f1∂f2
PA′ =
2 (
∑
fj − f1 − f2)
(
∑
fj − f2)3
> 0
Consequently, (62) is satisfied for any A ∈ B1.

8.16 Proof of corollary 4
For C(f) = θfη we have
C ′′(f) =
(η − 1)
f
C ′(f) (63)
Using V2 = 0, (63) and (16) in (44) gives
|p12 (f, f,R, n)|
−
(
p11 (f, f,R, n)− (η−1)f p1(f, f, n,R)
) < 1 (64)
Further calculate
p12 (f, f,R, n) = G(f)
( R∑
i=1
1
f(1 + n− i)
)2
−
R∑
i=1
n− i
f2(1 + n− i)2
 (65)
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and from (54)
p11 (f, f,R, n) = −G(f)
( R∑
i=1
1
f(1 + n− i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
f2(1 + n− i)2
 (66)
With (20) and V2 = 0 condition (44) is equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
( R∑
i=1
1
1 + n− i
)2
−
R∑
i=1
n− i
(1 + n− i)2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
((
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)2
)
+(η − 1)
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
(67)
which obviously is rather satisfied for larger η. Thus I set η = 2. If K ≥ 0 then (67) obviously
holds. If K < 0 then (67) also holds because
0 < 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1−n+i
(1+n−i)2 +
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
= 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
1−n+i
(1+n−i)2 +
R∑
i=1
1+n−i
(1+n−i)2
= 2
(
R∑
i=1
1
(1+n−i)
)2
+
R∑
i=1
2
(1+n−i)2

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